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A French officer working on Exercise Steadfast Cobalt 2015 ( SFCT 2015 ) in Walcz , Poland is backed by an array of satellite communication dishes . NATO troops from over 20 countries are taking part in the exercise in Walcz , Poland . - NATO ( Photo by SSGT Dan Bardsley GBR A )
ance is also capable of shooting satellites in their orbits and destroying them . However , this deterrence theory has problems when applied to a conflict in space with a near peer . Our adversary ’ s strategic goal will be to even the playing field against NATO by negating our advantage in space . Our enemies are fully aware that they may lose all of their space assets in the process , but this may be part of their plan . They believe that if NATO does not have an advantage in space , that their military , through sheer numbers , can defeat our militaries or make the conflict so difficult NATO will give up before the war escalates . Therefore , our strategy must shift to resiliency through disaggregation . Disaggregation is make more , less expensive , one mission satellites instead of spending excessive amounts of money on one satellite that can do multiple missions . In 2013 , U . S . Air Force Gen . William Shelton said , “ beyond the necessity of finding efficiencies and cost savings , we may very well find that disaggregated or dispersed constellations of satellites will yield greater survivability , robustness and resilience in light of environmental and adversarial threats 2 .” Part of the solution to this problem is Operationally Responsive Space ( ORS ). ORS is a program designed to provide simple , one-mission , satellites in order to deliver capabilities to the warfighter in operationally relevant time lines 3 . This is a form of strategic messaging designed to inform our enemies that if they attack our satellites , they will not be able to negate all of NATO ’ s advantages in space . This , hopefully , deters our enemies from attempting to destroy any NATO satellite assets .
If there is only one target that the enemy could destroy without causing massive disruption to a specific orbital regime , they are much more likely to attempt the attack . However , if you make it impossible for the opponent to destroy your capabilities without causing substantial destruction to all other nations , both militarily and economically on a global scale , then the threat of punishment from the entire world may prevent kinetic action in space . Simply by launching more satellites and creating more targets , NATO can prevent an enemy from attacking the space domain .
On the 11th of January in 2007 , the Chinese Military intentionally destroyed one of their own weather satellites in Low- Earth Orbit ( LEO ) creating a massive debris cloud from 200km to 3800km in altitude , which is almost the entire LEO regime . This event has caused other satellites in LEO to maneuver in order to avoid a collision , reducing mission life on those satellites 4 . The Chinese , with this one action , created a debris field that will remain in orbit for decades to come . Those specific orbits are now more difficult to operate within effectively .
It is not likely that a near peer would risk a military engagement that could destroy the use of space . However , the uncertainty in the behavior and actions of our adversaries could lead to a conflict in space . The US and NATO have , through precedent and current policies , declared that space is free and should not be a battleground . NATO ’ s near peers can be assured that we would never intentionally , preemptively , destroy an opponent ’ s satellite . We cannot assume that our adversaries will respect these same rules because they are actively researching and developing advanced anti-satellite technology .
NATO must prepare to defend our space system , mitigate adversary capabilities , and train to operate in a negated-space environment . NATO must use the best knowledge we have about our enemy , their policies and their military actions , to shape our decisions and our counter-actions . This potential campaign in space has major implications to the world order , much like the Cold War . This time , global life does not hang in the balance , but the global economy and quite possibly the use of certain orbital regimes are at risk . If the wrong decision is made , on either side , the lives of everyone on Earth ( not just the soldier on the ground ) will not be able to cope with possible impacts . Additionally , at this time there is no way to clean up space debris , which may leave certain orbital regimes useless for hundreds of years . In any case , our land forces must be prepared to fight in a negated space environment . Communications might be slower and less efficient , PNT may not work , and ISR may be much more difficult to obtain . Leaders must be aware that a negated space environment is highly likely , and should train their units to operate with degraded space capabilities .
1
Garber , Steve . “ NASA - HISTORY HOME .” Sputnik and The Dawn of the space Age . October 10 , 2007 . Accessed September 28 , 2016 .
2
Olsen , James M . “ Op-Ed | U . S . Air Force Takes Positive Step with space Based Environmental Monitoring RFI - spaceNews . com .” spaceNews . com . 2016 . Accessed September 29 , 2016 .
3
“ ORS Background .” Accessed September 28 , 2016 . http :// www . kirtland . af . mil / Portals / 52 / documents / AFD-150701-028 . pdf ? ver = 2016-06-28-112634-317 .
4
David , Leonard . “ Chinau0027s Anti-Satellite Test : Worrisome Debris Cloud Circles Earth | space . com .” February 2 , 2007 . Accessed September 28 , 2016 .
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