MAGAZINE
2022
embedded in the operating range of frequencies , and suppression of the main and side-lobe antenna signals of ground based radars for protection against airborne threats such as anti-radiation missiles ( ARMs ).
KRASUKHA-2 ( 1L269 )
The Krasuha-4 EW equipment is mounted on two KAMAZ-6350 vehicles . The complex 1RL257 includes two trailers with special equipment . Both trailers are equipped with complex electronic equipment and antennas of various designs . One trailer has an antenna unit on a sliding bar , apparently intended for communication . On the roof of the second trailer a set of antennas is mounted in a distinctive configuration . The three parabolic antennas can be rotated in any direction and at a desired elevation . Thus , the complex EW " Krasuha-4 " is able to transmit radio signals without restrictions in azimuth and elevation . Both machines use complex digital equipment with high performance characteristics .
Several reports are indicating that Krasukha-4 complex was successfully used in defending the Russian “ HMEYMIM ” air base in Syria that was attacked by armed , if not primitive , swarming drones13 . More recently , the Ukrainian Army seized the control unit of a Krasukha-4 near the capital Kyiv on 23 March , 2022 .
Conclusions
Analyzing recent conflicts has shown that the use of EW and a variety of electronic systems - not only military , but also civilian ( dual use ) - are essential to achieving mission objectives and include a vast range of mediums such as mass media , satellite , cellular , trunk communication networks , various social networks , departmental and amateur radio stations .
KRASUKHA-4 ( 1RL257 )
Russian EW development continues to utilize lessons learned from previous conflicts to focus field testing of critical systems . Employment of these systems to ground forces , in turn , enables realistic capability assessment and contributes to Russia ’ s shortto-medium-term EW strategy , which has been shaped by the experience its Armed Forces gained in various recent regional conflicts — namely , Syria , Libya , Karabakh and most recently , Ukraine .
In this context , it is worth citing Lieutenant General Yuri LASTOCHKIN , Chief of the Electronic Warfare Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation , who , when referring to a nexus between experience and EW capabilities , stated that , “ over the coming years Russia must embark , among other activities , on the development of robotic means of radio-electronic suppression as well as disorganization of enemy radio connections and data transfer ; but it must specifically prioritize the advancement of anti-drone warfare capabilities ” 14 .
Understanding the importance of EW can be challenging when compared to more tangible weapons such as stealth fighters or tanks . But today ’ s “ network-centric warfare ” is less about hitting the enemy harder than it can hit you , and more about locating the enemy first while making it hard for it to do the same ” 15 . That ’ s why troops in the field need to be trained and equipped for the war of the electromagnetic spectrum , a battlefield that should be recognised as key to victory in any future conflict .
Given the evolution of modern warfare and increasing reliance on new means of combat , involving various types of drones , EW will remain of the strategic importance in Russia ’ s military thinking for the foreseeable future . NATO ’ s ground forces must recognize this importance , and consider Russian EW capability in future planning and operations activities .
LC
19