LANDPOWER MAGAZINE 2022 2022 Edition, published Aug. 2022 | Page 17

to disrupt the Japanese communications link by attempting to transmit a stronger Radio Frequency ( RF ) signal over the “ SHINANO MURA ” signal , hoping to distort the Japanese ' s signal at the receiving end , Admiral Togo ' s4 Fleet HQ . Russian Admiral Rozhestvensky5 refused the Electronic Warfare advice and denied the URAL permission to electronically jam the enemy , which in those circumstances might have proved invaluable . Nevertheless , the commanders of the cruiser " IZUMRUD " and the destroyer " GROMKY ", on their own initiative , used the ship ' s radio stations to suppress the radio communications of Japanese warships . Thus , measures to suppress enemy radio communication systems were first carried out by Russian military specialists .
BORISOGLEBSK 2
MAGAZINE
2022
Modern EW developed rapidly from this point . Now all operations of any military consider how best to utilize EW , and Russia ’ s Armed Forces are no exemption .
The exponential development of EW capabilities over the past dozen years has been a critical element in the reform and modernisation of the Russian Armed Forces . Prior to the major reforms initiated in the fall of 2008 , the military ’ s existing EW capabilities were disparate , rudimentary and lacking investment . But as a result of the continued efforts to modernise the Armed Forces , EW became an organic high-technology-based feature of Russian military approaches to modern warfare . This capability is now being further employed in conflicts and exercises , with refinements benefiting from experimentation to further EW capability . These capabilities are regularly tested alongside other elements of the Armed Forces during combat training , with increased experimentation using Artificial Intelligence and automation6 .
EW has become a common buzzword in the defense community , though it is not always well understood . Its purpose is to deny an adversary from gaining control of , and having advantage in , the electromagnetic ( EM ) spectrum , while still ensuring friendly and unimpeded access for oneself and one ’ s allies . It is employed to support military operations in three ways : electronic attack , electronic protection , and electronic support .
Jamming is a key tool in electronic attack , and one that is commonly referenced in EW literature . The main method is to emit “ noise ” in a powerful signal strong enough to overload the adversary ’ s receivers . The result is a jamming of the signal that the receiving system is trying to detect , interrupting communications altogether .
Electronic protection involves guarding one ’ s own systems from these very attacks by hardening electronic sensors and by conducting electronic emission control so it is more difficult for an adversary to locate a target . Finally , electronic support are actions that search for , intercept , identify , and locate sources of EM emissions for the purpose of enabling the previous two functions . This can also be thought of as the reconnaissance element of EW .
Next we delve into the world of Russian Electronic Warfare
Systems . While there are numerous systems dedicated to EW at the disposal of the Russian Armed Forces , several systems are notable compared to the rest .
BORISOGLEBSK 2
Borisoglebsk 2 is a Russian , MT-LBu7 ground vehicle mounted , multi-functional EW mobile weapon system . The Borisoglebsk-2 merges four types of jamming stations into a single system with a single control console which requires the operator to take decisions within seconds8 . The Borisoglebsk-2 system is intended to suppress and disrupt mobile satellite communications and satellite-based navigation signals ( e . g . GPS ), basically jamming of HF / UHF ( both terrestrial and aircraft ) radio channels . Borisoglebsk 2 achieved initial operating capability in 2010 , but was not ordered and delivered to Russian military until February 2015 . This system was reportedly seized by Ukraine ' s 10th Mountain Assault Brigade in March 2022 during the Russian invasion of Ukraine .
MURMANSK-BN
The Murmansk-BN is a long-range communications jamming system specially designed to target the West ’ s High Frequency Global Communications System ( HFGCS ), military satellite communications , and also for electronic reconnaissance and suppression of enemy signals . This system was developed as part of a Russian strategic electronic warfare system and operates as a network-centric capability . The system is capable of intercepting communications between warships , aircraft and satellites . Furthermore , in both directions , blocking the flow of information from satellites to specific combat units .
The stated range depends on the source , but it is estimated at between 3000 km and 5000 km . The Murmansk-BN is mounted on seven heavy trucks , four of them carry the massive 32 meters / 102 foot telescopic masts . It takes several days to erect the masts and calibrate the system .
It was unveiled in November 2016 as the system prototype was achieving some test successes and the system was fully tested in October 2020 . The system has been deployed in Crimea ,
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