MAGAZINE
Introduction Climate change represents a multifaceted challenge for Russia . From an economic standpoint , reduced government revenues from energy exports as experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic due to a gradual phasing out of fossil fuels over time lead to budgetary constraints . Since early 2022 this challenge has been further compounded by Russia ’ s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent decision among EU member states to phase out Russian energy imports in an accelerated manner . Looking beyond current policy debates and decisions , there is a risk of stranded infrastructural assets : vulnerable energy infrastructure in Russia ’ s Arctic region risks being severely damaged due to melting permafost with global impacts on the environment , rendering the infrastructure economically useless . Moreover , with demand for Russian energy supplies in Europe dwindling and faced with major sanctions2 , Russia will increasingly face the problem of being unable to store excess oil supplies due to
a lack of available storage capacity . This has the knock-on effect of oil wells flooding and thus needing to be shut down . Once a well is shut , there is no opportunity for diverting the supply , meaning the supply goes offline indefinitely . Politically , the new commitment among Allied nations to phase out Russian energy imports reduces Moscow ’ s political leverage over importing nations . On top of this , climate change and associated policies serve to further erode Russia ’ s status as a global “ energy powerhouse ” in the long term .
Russia ’ s approach to climate change Russia is the fourth largest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide . 3 In terms of industrial greenhouse gas emissions , the Russian Federation is also home to one of the world ’ s most polluting companies : state-owned gas company Gazprom . 4 Russia has been a party to the Kyoto Protocol and ratified the Paris Climate Agreement . 5 In its National Determined Contribution Moscow pledges a reduction in emissions of 70 % below 1990s levels , taking in account the maximum possible
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absorptive capacity of forests and other ecosystems and subject to sustainable and balanced social economic development of Russia . 6 Although sounding ambitious , the target has actually been widely criticised as it takes the final years of the Soviet Union as its baseline . In 1990 , Soviet heavy industry was still producing at full speed . Following the USSR ’ s collapse into individual countries , and with it the demise of large parts of Soviet-era heavy industry , it is comparatively easy for Russia today to commit to reducing greenhouse gas levels , knowing that these are a mere fraction of what they were in 1990 for the Soviet Union as a whole . According to Carbon Tracker , an international environmental NGO , under Russia ’ s current policies , and after the effects of the COVID-19-related economic slowdown are considered , Russia ’ s emissions are projected to decline between 32 and 37 % by 2030.7 If various carbon sinks ( anything that absorbs more carbon from the atmosphere than it releases such as plants , the ocean etc .) are considered , Russia ’ s emissions are expected to decline between 38 to 43 % relative to 1990 levels . 8 In other words , under its existing pledges , Russia can expect to see its greenhouse gas emissions stay below what it emitted in 1990 . Up until recently the Kremlin viewed this as a kind of free pass to pollute at will and clinch onto its status of major hydrocarbon producer . However , the war in Ukraine , Russia ’ s projected economic decline in 20229 , and the likely difficulties for Russia to continue to sell its hydrocarbons abroad ( due to sanctions and hesitancy among buyers out of fear for secondary sanctions ) will greatly undermine this status and likely further depress Russian greenhouse gas emissions .
Prioritisation of Hydrocarbons In its Energy Strategy to 2035 , Russia speaks of vastly expanding its domestic production and consumption of fossil fuels , strongly emphasising growth in natural gas exports through liquefied natural gas ( LNG ). Climate only receives marginal attention in Russia ’ s main policy document on energy . The dominant view expressed is that Russia can easily meet its Paris Climate Agreement targets without resorting to major investments . 10 Despite its own marginal contribution , Russia routinely criticises other – chiefly Western – nations for their historic responsibility in the fight against climate change . The US ’ pullback from the Paris Agreement in November 2020
I . - Nationally Determined Contribution of the Russian Federation of 25 November 2020 . II . - Relative to 1990 levels . 13
I . - Nationally Determined Contribution of the Russian Federation of 25 November 2020 . II . - Relative to 1990 levels .