“ Now this is the phase where you assess your own sustainability . We provided the place and training . Now it is up to you how far you can make it successful , how you can make yourself empowered .”
— Saidullah Baig , CAI project manager in Paksitan ’ s Gilgit region
projects viable long term .”
One of CAI ’ s most promising communitydriven projects in Pakistan this past year was in a remote district of northern Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa province . Baig said the new Yarkhun Lasht College — a six-classroom building with an office , staff room , and examination hall — offers the first-ever opportunity for local students to pursue post-secondary education . The project is also important because of its proximity to Taliban havens .
“ Local people told me that many children were not even going to class 10 ,” Baig said . “ Girls stayed at home and got married , started making babies , and raised the population of these poor areas . Only a few boys got a chance to go to Chitral or other cities for higher education . That is why there are no college-level teachers and we have to bring teachers far from home .”
But with community support , “ when classes started in September , 70 percent of the students were girls ,” Baig said .
Once again , CAI focused on a region overlooked by government and other nongovernmental organizations ( NGO ), Baig said . “ The area is not easy to approach . Other NGOs only go where they can get easy access and where the people recognize them . CAI is working for the benefit of the remotest-areas ’ people . We go places where we don ’ t always know people at first , but we surely know their problems .”
DEVELOPMENTAL PROJECTS Demand for bricks-and-mortar projects , like the small college , seems endless . Yet CAI has had to become more selective about where it invests time and resources going forward , said C AI Board Chairman Steve Barrett . With an inventory of 191 schools , maintenance plus student and teacher support consume a large chunk of the budget .
“ Our core mission is doing what we do in places where no one else can or will do it , remote places at the end of the road ,” Barrett said . “ We ’ ve looked at all of CAI ’ s projects , one at a time . We have a lot to support and sustain . That leaves a modest amount for new building . Our resources are limited . And there are also on-the-ground realities .”
Which means for now , he said , “ Our work building schools is just more limited .”
One notable exception in 2014 was the push to finish 16 partially completed schools in central and eastern Afghanistan , most of them in Taliban-controlled areas such as Wardak , Kunar , Urozgan , Nangarhar and Logar provinces . In spite of shrinking reserves , CAI committed $ 1.6 million in the 2014-15 fiscal year to this effort .
“ Keeping our promise to finish construction on 16 new schools is a really big deal , especially as other NGOs are pulling back or retreating altogether from these areas ,” Executive Director Thaden said . “ We remain committed to providing opportunities for literacy
What works , and why
People in the international development world , especially funders , are always on the hunt for the “ secret sauce ” that leads to successful aid programs .
In September 2014 , Duncan Green , a strategic advisor for Oxfam in the UK , identified some new research along these lines . In his From Poverty to Power blog , Green wrote about a paper entitled “ Politically smart , locally led development ” from the Overseas Development Institute ( ODI ), an independent think tank in the UK .
ODI ’ s David Booth and Sue Unsworth looked at seven large , successful aid programs in search of the ingredients that , when combined , allow NGOs to succeed “ despite the odds ” working against them .
The research did not include Central Asia Institute ( CAI ). However , their findings reveal common elements for success that underscore CAI ’ s philosophy and approach . Those elements include :
� “ Purposive muddling :” Project teams experimented , hit dead ends , and tried something else . Spending and results built up over time . There was a lot of learning from previous failures , which required having experienced staff .
� Brokering relationships : Teams invested in the time-consuming effort to establish relationships and build trust and credibility with partners and institutions .
� Politically smart : Leaders were politically well informed and had the skills to use that knowledge effectively . They acquired their knowledge and skills in a variety of ways ( personal experience , commissioned political economy analysis , well-connected intermediaries ).
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