Journal on Policy & Complex Systems Volume 5, Number 2, Fall 2019 | Page 37

Journal on Policy and Complex Systems
a 60 % weight on being Kurdish likely overestimates the importance of Kurdish identity and underestimates the role of religious tension among Shia and Sunni Kurds , especially in Iran . Thus , I decided to increase the weight of religion .
In the third scenario , northern Iraq — including As-Sulaymaniyah , Arbil , and Dihok — and the northern parts of Syria — including Hasaka and Aleppo — are most probable and only Sanandaj in Iran , populated by Sunni Kurds , has a good chance of becoming engaged in the conflict ( Figure 3 ). However , the computational results show the same results as Scenario 2 in the highest probability and one city ( Sanandaj ) in the second rank . This overlap in results between Scenarios 2 and 3 is important because it means that the theory is likely robust to changes in the weighting factors . These provinces are likely to enter conflict no matter what .
It is important to mention the most recent situations at the time of writing as covered in global news indicate that Kurds have control over Afrin , Raqqa , Qamishli , and Hasaka in Syria , as well as control over As-Sulaymaniyah , Arbil , and Dihok ( Chughtai , 2019 ). This is a cursory validation of the computational results . Indeed , Kurds in cities like Sanandaj , which the results show has a good chance of engaging in conflict , has , in reality , been continuously engaged in the conflict with the central government , but still does not have not control over the cities . The only exception in the results is Aleppo . However , factors such as the massive displacement in Syria and domestic war and regional powers ’ policy toward the war may be affecting those results .
Conclusion and Next Steps

The model results confirm existing theories about ethnic tensions . Kurdish identity , existing religious tension , and government hegemony all play a role in this ethnic conflict . However , the model is simple and general . Still , it is important to acknowledge that the purpose of building this model is to study a specific case study — a Kurdish conflict for independence — and it might apply to other conflicts with further consideration . To study other ethnic conflicts , modelers might consider economic factors as well , or they may try different scenarios . Future versions of this model should incorporate the effects of the ongoing Syrian displacement , adding Turkey to the case study , considering role of superpowers in the conflict , and using sensitivity analysis on the weighting of factors to understand how the weights affect the model outcomes .

Different groups might benefit from the result of this model : pro-Kurdish movements within the government that try to resolve the conflict , anti-Kurdish movements within the government , and Kurds themselves . Visually-based computational results provide the opportunity for Kurds and pro-government groups to study the results of this model and perhaps use it as a foundation for policy dialogue . This may provide Kurds and pro-government groups with methods to solve
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