Confronting Model Uncertainty in Policy Analysis for Complex Systems : What Policymakers Should Demand
about climate change ( Eastin , Grundman , & Prakash , 2010 ).
A lesson from the Limits to Growth saga was to view computer models as something to use in exploring and contemplating , rather than in confidently predicting . The book presented valid danger signals about how bad the future would be unless major changes occurred . The contingent nature of this discussion was more clearly expressed in the 30-year update ( Meadows , Randers , & Meadows , 2004 ), but was present from the outset . Regrettably , policymakers and people generally have a difficult time with contingent predictions . No , collapse was not inevitable , and the study said so ( Gamino , 2012 ).
At the time of the publication of the Limits to Growth , scientists were doing well if they varied simulation parameters to generate diverse scenarios . To also vary the underlying conceptual models , and to do so in a comprehensible way enabling productive debate , was a bridge too far . Doing better is today feasible , but it is a grand challenge for policy analysts .
2.3 . The 2003 Iraq War and the 2007 Surge Operation
As a further example of why models matter , consider a strategic-military decision with profound consequences . The decision to invade Iraq in 2003 depended on assessments of what would happen after an invasion , assessments based on war gaming , more detailed simulation , and other analysis . It was believed that the military operation would be fast and decisive . 4
Some of the premises underlying the war proved wrong ( Saddam did not have nuclear weapons ), as did the planners ’ basic conceptual model of conflict ( Gordon & Trainor , 2012 ; Kaplan , 2013 ). Instead of conflict being brief and decisive , what emerged was insurgency and civil war .
In 2007 , after years of dismal results , President Bush authorized the surge , a last-ditch effort to salvage a losing war . Most observers opposed the surge , believing that it would either fail or be counterproductive ( Gordon & Trainor , 2012 ), but President Bush was persuaded by arguments from a group of analysts that conducted map games that could foresee a road to victory ( see Chapter 24 of Gordon & Trainor , 2012 ).
As it happened , the subsequent operations under the leadership of General David Petraeus were successful , although the surge in U . S . forces was only one of several reasons for the temporary success . In the so-called Anbar Awakening , Sunni tribal leaders concluded that it was in their interest to collaborate with Americans . Another factor was ethnic redistribution , as residents of mixed neighborhoods voted with their feet during the quasi-civil war , separating combatants . Also , President Maliki reluctantly recognized that Shia militias were a threat to his own
4 Some cautions were posted . Historical analysis warned about an invasion with such a small ground force ( Quinlivan , 1995 ). Reflecting such experience , the Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki told Congress that a much larger ground force was needed , something immediately derided by political leaders .
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