Multi-Group Conflict Paths : Anticipatory Scenarios of Attitudes and Outcomes
average preferences of the groups at an earlier time . This lag represents the delay between individuals ’ persuasion efforts in one period and the effects likely to emerge later .
To represent the homophilic linkages among group members , we consider them as nodes in a Renyi- Erdös network . The mean of preferences s of each group is proportional to the exponential of the negative energy representing the intensity of interactions :
( 1 )
The time lag between persuasion efforts and their effects is introduced in equations ( 1 ) by assuming that the preference s at time t + 1 interacts with the averages s1 , s2 , and s3 evaluated at a previous time t . The “ delay time ” units become the measure for time .
3 . Results : Attitudes , Conflict Paths , and Outcomes
To illustrate the model ’ s capabilities , we consider a situation where the upper limit of the attitudes s is the same for all three groups : M1 = M2 = M3 = 3 . 5 Then , to characterize qualitatively the behavior of the time dependence of s1 , s2 , and s3 , we need to plumb a nine-dimensional space , which is very challenging . Therefore , we show next a few examples of qualitatively different time evolutions of conflicts , by selecting specific values for the K and J parameters .
We take K12 = - 0.2 , K21 = 0.2 , K13 = 0 , K31 = 0.2 , K23 = 0 , K32 = 0.2 and weak intra-group couplings J1 = J2 = J3 = 0.15 , meaning that inside each group , members are not very active in persuading each other ( as might be the case in the Brexit dispute ). Then , the mean attitudes exhibit oscillations of decaying ( to zero ) amplitude ( Figure 1 ).
For stronger intra-group couplings J1 = J2 = J3 = 0.25 and same values for all inter-group couplings the oscillations are sustained with an am-
5 This means the full range of attitudes is from -3 to 3 for all groups . However , this might not be a realistic assumption in specific cases . The model can be adapted to the study of such cases .
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