Journal on Policy and Complex Systems
" the register of unscrupulous suppliers includes information on procurement participants who evaded contracting , as well as suppliers ( contractors , performers ) with whom contracts were terminated by a court decision or in case of unilateral refusal of the customer to execute the contract due to a substantial violation of the conditions contracts .”
In accordance with Part 9 of Art . 104 information on such procurement participants is put into the register for a period of 2 years ( SMB , 2016a ). So , procurement participants in case of violations are excluded from the public procurement process for 2 years , since , in accordance with part 1.1 of Art . 31 , customers have the right to require the absence of information about the procurement participant in the above registry , which they do in most cases . Thus , there is an unofficial term “ dishonest supplier ”— this is a procurement participant who avoided signing a contract , or a contract with which was terminated by the court or unilaterally due to significant breach of the terms of the contract . At the same time , the special law does not contain the term “ unscrupulous official of the customer ” for those who commit certain offenses in this area and , in particular , restricts competition .
Researchers pay most attention to the procedural and economic problems of government customers in studying government procurement . There are quite a lot of publications on this topic , many of which are distinguished by an integrated approach and a wide coverage of issues . This is understandable , since the main objective of this legal institution is to ensure efficient , cost-effective purchases of high-quality goods and services at minimal cost . In this regard , the scientific problem of saving labor costs for customers in the implementation of Federal Law No . 44 , providing opportunities for them to purchase high-quality goods , but not at high prices , is very serious . The problems of restricting competition in the public procurement market are perceived by scientists mainly as secondary , since the main purpose of this institution is not to expand the business opportunities of entrepreneurs per se , but instead to provide public budget savings while adequately meeting the needs of government customers .
In most developed countries , the federal contractual system aims not only to meet the needs of the state for goods and services at the lowest price , but is also used as a powerful regulator of the market that sets the trend for supporting innovative producers and small businesses . The influence of the state order system on the development of small business in the country is difficult to overestimate .
In this regard , there is a very interesting regression model by Fukina , Gafurova , and Notfullina ( 2016 ): ln ( OBOR ) = 12.934 + 0.884 × ln ( ZAK _ SMP ), where OBOR is the average regional annual turnover of Russian small enterprises , and ZAK _ SMP is the number of state and municipal customers who placed orders for small businesses per year . The adjusted R-square model of 52 % showed that the cash flow of
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