Multi-Group Conflict Paths : Anticipatory Scenarios of Attitudes and Outcomes
the key active participants — those making overt , observable , and behind-thescene moves ( North Korea , China , and the United States )— need to assess the consequences of trusting each other and making concessions that risk endangering one or more parties .
The parties to the North Korean conflict have information that stems chiefly from the fraught history of their past encounters . On the one hand , these encounters have undermined mutual trust and willingness to take any risks , and they have all but eliminated direct communications . On the other hand , all should expect the same ( poor ) results from continuing on the confrontational path . Switching to a different strategy might be helpful , but it is difficult to predict with any level of confidence what might work . The parties could proceed on a trial-and-error basis , testing limited actions and mutual responses to them to rebuild trust . However , conflict trajectories are path-dependent : by the time parties are engaged in one direction , they may practically eliminate other , more mutually desirable trajectories they did not foresee . If they could play out the future under different decision scenarios , the parties might be able to choose wisely and reduce some of the risks ( Lempert , Popper , & Bankes , 2003 ).
In this and other conflicts around the world , all parties might value insights into possible outcomes , were they to adopt a different approach or stay the course . The North Korea conflict is complex because it is embedded in shifting broader global conflicts and power struggles among the direct and indirect stakeholders , as well as contending with intra-national ( intra-group ) politics . The current negotiations may take some time , during which emergent factors may alter the interests and calculus of the parties . For instance , the United States and China have other differences that are not independent of the Koreas situation ; and , instead of waiting for North Korea to denuclearize , Japan might seek nuclear capability , altering the regional balance . The international context is likely to change in other ways too , as may key decision-makers , for example , due to elections in the democratic countries or coups in others . Therefore , predicting outcomes by extrapolating from the past or current situation is likely to be misleading . Instead , anticipatory tools , such as scenarios , may be helpful in exploring the range of possible futures ( Diep , Kaufman , & Kaufman , 2017 ; Kaufman , Diep , & Kaufman , 2019 ; Kaufman & Kaufman , 2013 , 2015 ; Kaufman , Kaufman , & Diep , 2017 ; Weaver et al ., 2013 ).
To examine the paths and outcomes of multiparty , complex , intractable conflicts , we adapt to them some statistical physics tools . Our approach belongs to the developing field of sociophysics , consisting of applying physics models to various aspects of social processes ( Barnes & Wilson , 2014 ; Galam , 2012 ; Godoy , Tabacof , & Von Zuben , 2017 ; Schweitzer , 2018 ; Stauffer , 2003 ; Wilson , 1969 ). The sociophysics approach to modeling intractable conflicts is illustrated by Liebovitch et al . ( 2008 ) and Kaufman and Kaufman ( 2013 ). Such models rely on finding analogies
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