Scenarios of Social Conflict Dynamics on Duplex Networks
could explore various outcome scenarios that could result from these patterns . For example , we assume that those who prefer to remain in the EU for staying in Europe are members of Group 1 whose preferences s range from 3 to −2 , as well as those in Group 2 who are most accommodating , with s = −3 . The rest ( Group 1 members with s = −3 and Group 2 members with s from 3 to −2 ) would rather break away from the EU .
In another possible Brexit scenario , Group 1 members with preferences s from 3 , to −2 prefer to stay in the EU ; Group 2 members with preference values s between 3 and −2 would rather break away ; members of both groups whose preference value s =
−3 are disengaged and do not vote . Here is the outcome in this scenario :
United States Presidential Elections Case , 2016
Next , we simulate the dynamics
leading to the outcome of the 2016
U . S . elections . Republicans are Group 1 and Democrats are Group 2 . In our model , Democrats are more cohesive than
Figure 4 . Time evolution of the attitudes s = 3 and −3 .
Figure 5 . Time evolution of fractions of democrats and republican supporters . In this scenario the attitude s = −3 in both groups either do not vote or vote for third party .
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