Complexity , Innovation , and Development
fer to developing countries . This view is indeed consistent with the “ derived development ” concept that Wallich used as a basis for rejecting Schumpeter ’ s relevance to emerging countries . Singer , however , understood that the successful transfer of “ appropriate technologies ” would require a functional domestic infrastructure . 68
Christopher Freeman , who created the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex , agreed with Singer , and their joint work resulted in the creation of the “ Sussex Group ,” which Singer chaired . In 1970 , it produced a highly influential document , The Sussex Manifesto : Science and Technology to Developing Countries during the Second Development Decade , which was incorporated into UN documents and became a basis for subsequent international decisions on technology transfer . 69
These efforts led to the Vienna 1979 UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development , which created a commission , fund , and center to implement its decisions . 70 The “ technology transfer ” debate quickly became highly acrimonious as it extended to cover issues such as intellectual property . The diplomatic push for “ technology transfer ” was seen by Singer as a way to correct the global economy duopoly and very much mirrored the overall imbalance in trade relations . But industrialized countries saw it as impinging on the intellectual property rights that were owned not by governments but by enterprises . Ironically , this program that put power in the hands of governments and largely excluded the private sector did not face new pressures to protect private sector interests .
In 1993 , the UN Centre for Science and Technology for Development was aboished . The UN Fund on Science and Technology for Development was absorbed by the UN Development Programme . Only the UN Commission for Science and Technology for Development survived the purge and was integrated into the UN Conference on Trade and Development . The UN created a variety of science and technology advisory mechanisms , but they were hardly effective , partly because they were providing advice that nobody asked for or acted on when provided . 71
Recasting Schumpter : Policy Implications
Schumpeter ’ s prescient ideas laid a firm basis upon which researchers and policymakers are now reshaping development policies in the context of innovation .
68
See H . W . Singer , “ Dualism Revisited : A New Approach to the Problems of the Dual Society in Developing Countries ,” Journal of Development Studies 7 ( 1 ) ( October 1970 ): 63 . It is notable that Singer uses the word “ appropriate technology .” This is not accidental . According to D . J . Shaw , “ He admired the work of E . F . Schumacher , the chairman of the Intermediate Technology Development Group in London , who first introduced the concept of ‘ intermediate technology ’ in a report for the Indian Planning Commission in 1963 . Schumacher emphasized that ‘ small is beautiful ’ and stressed the importance of smaller-scale , labour-intensive , and the more natural or organic , technologies developed for Third World countries .” Shaw , Sir Hans
Singer , 177 – 178
69
The Sussex Group helped to prepare a “ World Plan of Action on the Application of Science and Technology to Development ” for the United Nations . Ibid ., 174 – 179 .
70
National Academy of Sciences , Knowledge and Diplomacy : Science Advice in the United Nations System ( Washington , D . C .: National Academy of Sciences , 2002 ), 6 – 11 .
71
G . Oldham , “ Science and Technology Advice within the United Nations : Some Lessons from Past Experience ,” Science and Public Policy 33 ( 9 ) ( 2006 ): 647 – 651 .
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