Dissolution of a Global Alliance
longing to it , is determined through the following change in the i ’ s propensities :
p ij
total
( t ) = J ij + α i ( t ) p ijG
+ p ij
K
( 9 )
the dissolution of a global alliance in the multi-factor stability will have a weaker effect on the stable coalitions than the dissolution in the uni-factor case .
This effect comes from the fact that when contributions from one global alliance dismiss , coalitions may remain stable due to contributions from the opposing stable alliance . The co-existence of attraction to the opposing alliances concurrently on multiple factors may thus dramatically improve the robustness of the stability .
It can be noted that the multi-factor setting in coalition forming corresponds to countries with democratic form of government . The stability in those settings is a priori more robust and resistant to the dissolution . In contrast , the uni-factor stability appears to be linked to authoritarian form of government where one of the opposing groups solely dictates over the country ’ s interest . For this reason , the authoritarian structures tend to collapse suddenly , bringing thereby extensive instability followed by a burst of ongoing conflicts .
In this frame , the dissolution of the Soviet side is a dramatic example . Soviet alliance represented an authoritarian regime where the communist countries , on any factors of their interest , were focused on the Soviet ideology . The political dictatorship was reinforced by a centralized economic support . When the alliance dismissed , the coalition collapsed at once with the simultaneous loss of the influence that the ideology has held over all the Eastern Europe including the Caucasian region .
Comparing the stability conditions ( 5 ) and ( 6 ) for the uni-factor and the multi-factor stabilization correspondingly , it appears that in the first case the condition must be satisfied for the amplitudes from a unique factor and in the second one , it must be satisfied for several independent factors simultaneously . Therefore the stability is easier to attain within the authoritarian than within the democratic settings . At the same time , as we have seen , once the stability is reached , it is more solid within the democratic settings . This conclusion is coherent with several historical events from the past and also from the recent times ( Linz and Alfred 2011 ; Rutherford 2013 ).
5 Conclusion
Due to the evolutionary changes in
the system ’ s environment , a global alliance which has sustained a stable coexistence with an opposing alliance may dissolve . Such changes produce an attenuation of the interactions between the countries previously motivated by this alliance and reveal the primary propensities between the countries . When the circuits of bonds are negative the dissolution produces an instability .
For actors with limited rationality — the ones that are unable to foresee improvements beyond a limited number of intermediate steps , such negative circuit may produce no changes with regard to the stability of the coalitions . However , for countries which are fully rational , the dissolution may result in one of two utter cases of instability .
The first one is when the instability propagates to the stable coalition and the entire system goes into instability . The second one is when the unstable part disconnects as a result of the dissolution from the stable one , and the system is divided into stable and unstable parts . Various historical cases illustrate the situation , some of which
105