Journal of Critical Infrastructure Policy
While the Healthcare and Public Health Sector and the Emergency Services Sector remain in the forefront , all CI sectors continue to adapt to changing pandemic conditions . In order to ensure continuity of operations for essential functions , in mid-year 2020 , the Centers for Disease Control issued guidelines for critical infrastructure employees exposed to COVID-19 . This guidance permitted CI employees to continue working following potential exposure , provided they remained asymptomatic and additional precautions were implemented to protect them , their organizations , and the community . Despite significant challenges to their operations and workforce , the Energy Sector did an outstanding job maintaining electric service to Americans adapting their family and work lives to unprecedented conditions .
As 2020 progressed , the Transportation , Food and Agriculture , Commercial Facilities , and other sectors were heavily impacted . Many CI operators reassessed their objectives , adjusting to upward , downward , or erratic service demand . In an unexpected turn , the locus of the pandemic response shifted from the federal to the state and local levels . As governors and mayors know , the geographic sprawl of CI systems often transcends their political jurisdictions , sometimes complicating crisis decision-making .
It will take years to fully unwind the lessons of this pandemic . But it is worth stating the obvious now — that awareness of the most predictable public health catastrophe did not result in pandemic safeguards prior to the event ’ s occurrence . 3 At present , across multiple critical infrastructures , preparedness is far from assured . That is one reason why JCIP includes emergency management within the scope of its interest . Whether natural or human caused — or the result of other factors — cascading failures of CI systems can occur . The Emergency Services Sector and other responders must be prepared and equipped for events of that magnitude .
It is also worth noting that the impact of major , long-term CI lapses can exceed those of a pandemic in terms of human and economic consequences . For example , if an extended , large footprint power outage were to occur , financial markets would collapse , most strategic supply chains would halt , and the vast majority of hospitals would close following the depletion of backup generator fuel .
But there is also cause for optimism at this stage . Vaccine development during the current crisis vividly demonstrates how quickly a national effort to devise solutions can produce results . During this profound challenge and in its aftermath , it is hoped that a shared experience of this scale will give rise to heightened resilience for the critical infrastructures on which we all depend . The articles in this issue are intended to contribute to that goal .
3 The SARs and MERs coronavirus outbreaks occurred in 2003 and 2012 , resp . There were many serious communicable disease outbreaks internationally during the period 2000-2020 .
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