Journal of Critical Infrastructure Policy
limited to their so-called “ run-of-the-river ” capacity once reservoirs are drawn down . In any event , it is not within the scope of this paper to compare the relative technical feasibility and Grid operational and resilience impacts , nor the economic and environmental merits of the “ renewables plus storage ” vs . rNPP approaches .
Resilient Critical Infrastructure Island ( rCIIs )
How might rNPPs be leveraged to enhance the resilience of other Critical Infrastructure ? Each of the nation ’ s sixteen Critical Infrastructure sectors ( PDD 2013 ) embodies its own geospatial “ grid ” or network of essential facilities ( e . g ., natural gas and petroleum refineries , pumping stations / compressors and pipelines , the internet , air traffic control radars , etc .). These CI grids are often intertwined and interdependent ( DOE 2017 ). The dependence of power generation facilities on the transportation sector for delivery of fuel , and the dependence of the water / wastewater infrastructure on the Grid are two simple examples . Siting and integration of rNPPs with other Critical Infrastructure in resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands ( rCIIs ) at the geospatial intersections of these existing CI Sector grids could provide significant near-term Grid and CI resilience benefits . rCIIs are defined as “ an engineered network of multiple Critical Infrastructure Sector facilities and their interconnections ( electric power , internet , pipelines , rail , etc .), powered by a fuel-secure rNPP , and co-located within a small ( a few to tens of km ) geographical area ” ( Greene 2018d ). Figure 3 depicts a generic rCII .
Facilities ( such as factories , internet hubs and data centers , fuel refineries , military bases , etc .) located within the rCII would use the electricity and thermal energy produced by the rNPP in a “ mini- or micro-grid ” configuration capable of operating in isolation ( hence the “ island ” terminology ) from the surrounding electric Grid for months , or even years if necessary . This could occur following major Grid disruptions in which other CI and SASC would be dysfunctional . By enduring the initial disruptive event and continuing to operate , rCIIs would enable a radial “ build-outward ” national Grid , CI , and SASC recovery and restoration strategy in the wake of national catastrophes of both natural and man-made origins .
The safety characteristics of rCIIs should enable smaller plant footprints and public exclusion zones — allowing their location closer to facilities utilizing their thermal energy and electricity products . Some rCIIs might operate in an air gap mode in which no rCII cyber or power transmission interfaces are connected to external entities during normal operations – thus reducing the vulnerability of the rCII to cyberattack and Grid disruptions . This mode of operation would enhance the likelihood that the rCII would remain operational in the wake of major Grid disruption . It would also assure that the rNPP , and infrastructure elements within the rCII could reconnect to the world outside the boundary of the rCII to bootstrap surrounding Grid , CI , and SASC . If geographically dispersed , optimally sited , and appropriately integrated into the Grid , rNPPs and rCIIs could be the
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