Journal of Critical Infrastructure Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall/Winter 2020 | Page 5

Editor ’ s Letter
Journal of Critical Infrastructure Policy • Volume 1 , Number 2 • Fall / Winter 2020

Editor ’ s Letter

Richard M . Krieg , PhD
This JCIP edition contains articles submitted in response to a Call for Papers on Critical Infrastructures and COVID-19 as well as articles having broader significance for national critical infrastructure ( CI ) policy . The pandemic is serving as a stress test for each of the Nation ’ s CI sectors 1 , and a reminder that when they occur , lower probability events can have enormous impact . COVID-19 has also put issues of community resilience into sharp focus . This includes society ’ s reliance on the full array of infrastructure systems , inter-sectoral dependencies , strategic supply chains , and the professionals and practitioners who operate these complex systems of systems . Perhaps as never before , the need to embed resilience at the community and CI levels is apparent .
When the virus began propagating in early 2020 , both privately held and publicly run CIs considered the nature and scope of potential response measures . The Healthcare and Public Health Sector was attuned to pandemic planning owing to preparations for the Swine Flu pandemic and a worldwide H5N1 outbreak . As those of us in the Sector recall , H5N1 had been circulating through Asia , North Africa , and the Middle East for years , achieving global spread in 2008 . It had a 60 percent mortality rate for those contracting it .
Fortunately , overseas mortality attributable to that virus ended up being relatively low , and H5N1 dissipated before endangering the U . S . The Swine Flu ( like the 1918 Spanish Flu , an H1N1 variant ) was declared a pandemic in April 2009 , with direct impact on the U . S . Based on these and other outbreaks , there was a major surge of public health planning , vaccine development , and antiviral drug distribution . Techniques that were refined in that period such as Crisis Standards

of Care , have been heavily utilized in the COVID-19 response . Despite the earlier events , health professionals could not have predicted the current pandemic ’ s virulence nor lethality . However , over the past decade , public officials have advocated that serious pandemic planning was essential . 2

1 There are 16 critical infrastructure sectors whose assets , systems , and networks , whether physical or virtual , are considered so vital to the U . S . that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security , national economic security , national public health or safety , or any combination thereof . Presidential Policy Directive 21 identifies these sectors : Healthcare and Public Health ; Energy ; Information Technology ; Transportation Systems ; Communications ; Emergency Services ; Financial Services ; Chemical ; Critical Manufacturing ; Nuclear Reactors , Materials and Waste ; Government Facilities Water and Wastewater Systems ; Food and Agriculture ; Defense Industrial Base ; Dams ; Commercial Facilities .
2 “ Guidance for Establishing Crisis Standards of Care for Use in Disaster Situations ,” Institute of Medicine , National Academies Press , 2009 .
1 doi : 10.18278 / jcip . 1.2.1