Building Resilience and Recoverability of Electric Grid Communications
This study estimates the cost of building resilience and recoverability in electric grid telecommunications subsystem to an EMP attack and a cascading grid collapse . We also estimate the cost of providing long-term backup power for the grid ’ s communications system . With minor adaptation , our methodology can be used to estimate protection costs for other electric grid subsystems .
We demonstrate how engineering analysis , vendor cost data , and publicly available information on facility counts can be combined to produce the requisite cost estimates . Detailed estimates such as these can be used to assess how resilience improvements apply for all hazards and threats . These include both natural and human-caused events that could produce a cascading collapse followed by the loss of auxiliary power for communications systems in large geographic areas .
To calculate the costs for grid resilience and recoverability , we first determined the vulnerabilities of individual pieces of equipment and estimated the cost to mitigate those weaknesses . We then determined the number of facilities to be protected and their associated equipment counts . With this information , we multiplied the per-unit protective costs by count of units to be protected . This procedure was repeated for each type of equipment and category of facility . Finally , we added the costs for each category of facility to determine the total cost for protection .
In the analysis , we estimate the cost of EMP shielding and long-duration backup power for grid telecommunications equipment . EMP shielding for communications equipment is a well-developed technology because the U . S . Department of Defense has protected its strategic systems for several decades . Protection commonly consists of shielded cabinets that act as Faraday Cages , filters for power and other conductors that penetrate cabinet walls , and low impedance grounding grids to absorb EMP .
Were an EMP attack to collapse portions of the U . S . electric grid , a functioning telecommunication system and long-duration backup power would be necessary for recovery . We examined several on-site power generation technologies and determined that Stirling engines powered by propane are the most cost-effective , long-duration backup power source , although other options could also be viable . These include hydrogen fuel cells and the post-event deployment of pre-positioned solar panels with battery storage .
We researched costs by contacting vendors of protective devices , shielded cabinets , backup power sources , and fuel tanks ; construction companies ; and ra-
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