Journal of Critical Infrastructure Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall/Winter 2020 | Page 143

Building Resilience and Recoverability of Electric Grid Communications
Survivable communications are the lynchpin for responding to this type of event and restoring electricity ( e . g ., ability for power companies to communicate with each other and the government ).
The NIAC report verifies that the nation ’ s communication infrastructure is illequipped to respond to a catastrophic event :
• All communication systems are vulnerable to damage or attack , necessitating a variety of possible communication methods .
• Current emergency communication systems are unlikely to provide the multi-sector connectivity and interoperability that will be essential in catastrophic power outages .
• Communication networks were designed for power outages that are infrequent or of short duration ; backup generators and fuel storage are designed to support an outage of a few hours to a few days .
• Communications systems will require fuel for generators , but pipeline pumping stations , storage depots , and truck distribution could be affected by a catastrophic power outage , preventing necessary resupply needed for communication networks to continue to operate .
• Backup power generation is a commonly accepted emergency response standard , but backup communication capabilities are generally not standard .
• Existing plans and exercises rely on communications systems , which are likely to be unavailable or degraded during a catastrophic power outage . Cross-sector coordination and support require broader telecommunications hardening .
The Electric Grid and Its Telecommunication System

The North American electric grid , consisting of the U . S . electric grid and the associated Canadian electric grid , is the world ’ s largest machine . Electricity is produced at generating stations , stepped up to high voltage for transmission , and then stepped down for distribution to homes and businesses .

The North American electric grid is divided into three principal regions : Eastern Interconnection , spanning the East Coast to the Rocky Mountain Continental Divide ; Western Interconnection ; and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas ( ERCOT ), generally contiguous with the political boundaries of Texas . Each interconnection operates on a separate alternating current frequency of 60 cycles per second , with a few high voltage direct current ties between the interconnections .
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