Journal of Critical Infrastructure Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall/Winter 2020 | Page 142

Journal of Critical Infrastructure Policy
Introduction
Ensuring the availability of reliable , resilient communications is fundamental to the operation of the electric grid and other components of the U . S . critical infrastructure . These , in turn , are vital to national security and economic prosperity . A catastrophic outage of the U . S . electric grid could seriously threaten critical , life-sustaining services , jeopardize the health of millions of people , and cost trillions of dollars in lost Gross Domestic Product ( GDP ).
Protecting utility communication systems and their power sources from EMP effects will increase electric grid resilience to a wide spectrum of hazards and facilitate rapid recovery , reducing the probability of extended outages . This study identifies proactive , cost-effective solutions that could be implemented promptly to protect utility communication and control systems from solar storms and EMP caused by nuclear detonations in the atmosphere or ground-based attacks . It also identifies possible sources of federal grants and methods of cost recovery to encourage utilities to invest in grid resilience .
In January 2010 , Metatech Corporation , under contract to Oak Ridge National Laboratory , published Report Meta-R-320 , “ The-Early-Time ( E1 ) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse ( HEMP ) and Its Impact on the U . S . Power Grid ” ( Savage , Gilbert , & Radasky , 2010 ), along with three other reports on EMP . The executive summary for this series of reports states :
The nation ’ s power grid is vulnerable to the effects of an electromagnetic pulse ( EMP ), a sudden burst of electromagnetic radiation resulting from a natural or man-made event . EMP events occur with little or no warning and can have catastrophic effects , including causing outages to major portions of the U . S . power grid possibly lasting for months or longer . ( Oak Ridge National Laboratory , 2010 )
In May 2018 , the National Security Council tasked the President ’ s National Infrastructure Advisory Council ( NIAC ) to “ examine the nation ’ s ability to respond to and recover from a catastrophic power outage of a magnitude beyond the modern experience , exceeding prior events in severity , scale , duration , and consequences ” ( NIAC , 2018 ). The resulting report observes :
National plans , response resources , and coordination strategies would be outmatched by a catastrophic power outage . A catastrophic power outage could paralyze entire regions with grave consequences for national security , economic security , and public health and safety .
The report further determined that restoration and recovery are almost impossible without functioning communications :
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