Journal of Critical Infrastructure Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall/Winter 2020 | Page 26

Journal of Critical Infrastructure Policy
pork , chicken , and other food processing , the subsequent loss of flow demonstrated the preexisting network ’ s careful calibration , efficiency , and self-organized criticality . But even with these structural constraints , during the first six months of the pandemic , high volume , high velocity networks could mostly close-the-gap with much higher-than-expected demand .
In contrast , when demand surged for previously low volume product categories ( such as many forms of PPE , medical goods , or COVID-19 testing ), the production capacity simply did not exist to substantially increase volumes in a timely way . Given the capacity and adaptability of freight markets , velocity could sometimes be increased but this mostly caused finite supplies to crater faster . Creating new capacity is an entirely different strategic problem ( or opportunity ) than exploiting existing capacity . 17 Accurately understanding the strategic context visà-vis capacity is crucial in any high-risk context . If disease penetration requires long-term shutdowns of food processing facilities during the pandemic , this loss of capacity will not be readily replaced . Workforce absence is also likely to constrain capacity following a Cascadia seismic event . Permanent loss of some workplaces is also possible .
Supply Chains , at their most basic , facilitate movement of goods and services in response to an expression of demand . Early in the pandemic ( March-May 2020 ), the grocery supply chain in the United States experienced unprecedented increased demand , increased movement , and significant shifts in production and processing . Much more money was spent at grocery stores . This stimulated more movement by more trucks delivering more volume . To deliver high demand products , unused or underutilized production capacity was redirected . In many cases , production capacity for lower demand products was repurposed to increase production of higher demand products . In most cases , overall production capacity did not increase , but the output volume for high demand products was substantially increased by adapting existing capacity to new demand levels .
The maps and methods set out in the next section ( and in the first installment ) identify the preexisting strategic capacity that feeds the four million-plus residents of Puget Sound . These maps and methods help answer fundamental questions : Has capacity been lost ? If so , why ? What are the key dependencies and interdependencies ? What has been temporarily disrupted ? Why ? What network linkages — transportation , water , electricity , workforce or whatever — will most quickly restore the most capacity ? Given the confusion and uncertainty of the crisis , how should priority be given to reestablishing food production capacity ? If twenty percent of capacity is lost , what does that mean for the surviving population ? If forty percent is lost , what does that mean ? What if more than forty percent is lost ? That food mostly persisted flowing during the early stage of the pandemic , despite significant challenges , largely reflects the systemic continuity of capacity
17 Delivering Pandemic Resilience , DHL Research and Innovation Group ( September 2020 ).
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