22 Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
trust , if not romanticize .
Moreover , Arafat presumably reckoned , Washington might eventually take a tougher line on Israel as the result of pressure from Egypt and Saudi Arabia , two Arab countries that loomed large in the worldview of American policy makers , and from the European Union . And there was the long-term possibility that Israel , a firstworld country , would begin to tire of the struggle and its daily toll of military and civilian casualties , the negative impact on the nation ’ s mood and psyche — not to speak of its economy — and the potentially growing international isolation .
But here he miscalculated . Israel didn ’ t tire . Instead , it stayed the course , showing remarkable national resilience in the process . And the United States stood by Israel , recognizing and exposing Arafat for who he was and refusing to have any further dealings with him .
When Mahmoud Abbas succeeded Arafat , there was some hope that , despite his long association with his predecessor and a doctoral dissertation that smacked of Holocaust denial , he might offer a more promising approach to peacemaking . This was buttressed when Salam Fayyad , widely considered a political moderate and voice of pragmatism , became the Palestinian prime minister .
Regrettably , however , Abbas has proved a disappointment , especially when he walked away from a trailblazing two-state offer by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in 2008 . That Israeli proposal went even further than Barak ’ s in 2000-1 , as Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat acknowledged : “ I heard [ Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud ] Olmert say that he offered [ Abbas ] 100 % of the West Bank territory . This is true . I ’ ll testify to this .” And so , yet another chance for peace , based on two states , was lost .
What exactly is Israel expected to do to ensure the safety of its citizens ? What would other states do in a similar situation ?
Perhaps the repeated jihadist attacks in Europe , Africa , the