generated counterproductive consequences. For instance, they have undermined domestic efforts to promote human rights in Malawi( Englund 2006) and resolve grassroots conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo— henceforth Congo— and Tajikistan( Gallo and Vanholder 2015; Heathershaw 2009); at times they have even fueled violence, as in Afghanistan( Martin 2014), Congo( Autesserre 2014b), and Uganda( Branch 2011).
Combining these conflicting insights raises two central research questions: Should international actors support local peacebuilding processes? If so, how can they actually do this? To answer these questions, my broad project investigates whether, how, why, and under what conditions international interveners can contribute to successful local and bottom-up peace efforts. To do so, it builds on, refines, and expands my earlier research on international peacebuilding( see notably Autesserre 2010 and 2014b). This article presents the first findings from this new project. It makes three central contributions, which constitute the first three sections of this paper.
First, it demonstrates that the policy and scholarly literatures suffer from a dearth of findings on successful international support to local peace efforts. Second, it emphasizes the crucial— and under-researched— role of assumptions in shaping peacebuilding initiatives. Third, it develops a theoretical framework to analyze how assumptions influence the effectiveness of international peace efforts. By way of illustration, the last part analyzes three widespread assumptions about peacebuilding and the role of peacebuilders. In each case, it challenges assumptions that international interveners take for granted but that are actually unfounded and detrimental, and it identifies assumptions that promote peacebuilding effectiveness. In the conclusion, I highlight the policy and scholarly implications of my analysis, and I emphasize the need for further research to answer fully the two questions at the heart of my broader project.
This article relies on rich ethnographic material in addition to numerous secondary sources. My ethnographic material includes 718 in-depth interviews, three and a half years of field observations, and participant observations of hundreds of peacebuilding events and projects. I collected this data primarily in Congo( where I traveled regularly between 2001 and 2016). I also draw on research visits to Afghanistan( in 2002), Burundi( where I went several times between 2003 and 2012), Cyprus( in 2011), Israel and the Palestinian Territories( in 2012), Kosovo( in 2000), Nicaragua( in 1998), South Sudan( in 2011), and Timor-Leste( in 2012 and 2016). In addition, I build on participant observations and interviews conducted in the New York headquarters of various international and non-governmental organizations as well as interviews in African, European, North American, and Oceanic capitals( between 1999 and 2016).
The article is also informed by a thorough analysis of primary source documents from international programs, an extensive review of available policy and scholarly studies of peacebuilding( during which I paid particular attention to impact studies and randomized control trials), and a systematic review of ninety-seven evaluations of international projects in support of local peace initiatives.
Unlike most existing literature, my analysis does not seek to account for intervention successes or failures at the aggregate( national or international) level. Instead, it considers the relative effectiveness of individual peacebuilding projects and programs and the common factors that contribute to their success. To that end, I use a situation-specific definition of effectiveness that reflects the contested understandings of peace, success, and failure( on these, see Autesserre 2014b, 21 – 24; CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2011, 3). We consider the peacebuilding project, program, or intervention to be effective when a large majority of implementers( international and local peacebuilders) and intended beneficiaries( including local elite and ordinary citizens) perceive it as having promoted peace in the area of intervention. My definition does not require that a program or project garner universal praise— some individuals or groups will always be dissatisfied.