The Jihadist Movement and Hirak in Algeria
Also , when Hirak broke out on February 22 , 2019 , terrorist groups were , at best , in a survival situation and incapable of influencing this movement or even benefiting from it . Indeed , as Salima Tlemçani notes , “ Until a few years ago , one could count between 15 and 20 incidents per month linked to terrorist activities . Today , that number has dropped to almost zero .” At present , the armed groups are considered to have been practically wiped out and those that remain are almost inactive . Moreover , these groups are essentially made up of two distinct generations of “ population ,” the first of which consists of a hard core of combatants who are seasoned and often elderly veterans . The second generation is composed of young Algerian volunteers who , between 2012 and 2013 , wanted , through AQIM and other local armed groups , to join the jihadist groups active in the Middle East , but who were blocked in Algeria and forced to fight in the ranks of AQIM . Worse , according to Salima Tlemçani , some of these young people felt trapped not only by the authorities for joining the terrorist maquis , but also by these armed groups who prevented them from leaving for Syria / Iraq . Also , many of them often preferred to surrender to the security services .
All of this took place in a context where the recruitment of young jihadists had almost come to a halt . Indeed , it was becoming increasingly difficult if not impossible to find young candidates for jihad . Rather than sending these young people to join their organizations in the Middle East , the leaders of the armed groups kept them in Algeria in order to better resist the almost total absence of new recruits from their ranks . Indeed , as one Algerian official pointed out , “ the armed groups had lost their legitimacy among the local population , which practically no longer supported them . And , increasingly , these armed groups have not been able to compensate for the losses suffered between 2014 and 2019 . On the other hand , it should be noted that the number of Algerian combatants abroad was very low and that losses in their ranks were also heavy . According to estimates , between 2011 and 2015 about five hundred young Algerian jihadists went to fight in Syria / Iraq and half of them died there , while a hundred others have either returned to Algeria and are currently imprisoned or are under surveillance . About two hundred thus remained there . Finally , a strong security network at the country ’ s borders , supported by constant surveillance by the security services , has greatly limited the phenomenon of re-infiltration into the country . As a result , the armed groups still active in Algeria cannot expect any substantial influx of Algerian jihadist fighters back home .
In this context , no attacks have been reported during the first months of 2019 , while several arrests linked to terrorist groups have taken place in the regions of Khenchela and Batna . This also tends to confirm a withdrawal of jihadists toward the Algerian east , near the Tunisian border .
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