International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 2020 | Page 77

International Journal on Criminology
We can evaluate the START data comparatively, using a chronology produced
by a Peruvian non-governmental research center for the period 1980–88
(DESCO 1989: 65–249). This offers some surprises. DESCO records only 108 incidents
for 1987: less than a quarter of the number given by START. However, the
description of the incidents is sufficiently precise 12 for us to discriminate between:
• Terrorist actions: 62 cases (57.5%).
• Guerrilla actions: 11 cases (10%).
• Mixed terrorist-guerrilla actions: 15 cases (14%).
• MRTA actions: 7 cases (6.5%).
• Others: 13 cases (12%).
Such analysis has a clear value when we are trying specifically to study the
role and functions of terrorist actions, in that it distinguishes them from other activities
in the SP’s repertoire of action. Furthermore, it allows us to raise questions
about the consistency of databases like that of START on matters of terrorism.
These databases offer little descriptive information to distinguish clearly between,
for instance, guerrilla warfare and terrorism, or to understand the different functions
of terrorist actions in relation to the situation motivating them.
To go a little further, we can use an even smaller subsample: the incidents
recorded for a random month. For July 1987, the databases report the following:
• START: 43 incidents, of which 7 (16%) related to guerrilla warfare and 36
(84%) to terrorism.
• DESCO: 5 incidents, all terrorist.
For the same month, Mickolus et al. reported no international terrorist incidents,
and RAND reported only one. Even more striking, however, is the discrepancy
between the data offered by START and DESCO, which undoubtedly
has various causes. Of the 5 cases in DESCO, only 1 is also found in START, which
gives a different number of deaths (3 in START and 4 in DESCO) and a one-day
difference in date. Such discrepancies in the data, which are not limited to the SP,
should encourage a great deal of prudence when using the statistics about “terrorism”
from these sources (also distorted by the small numbers involved). The case
of the SP leads us to a more general problem about “terrorism” databases, the main
elements of which are discussed in the very useful article by Sheehan (2012).
12 The criteria used are: (a) Terrorist actions: explosions intended to create publicity, assassinations
of civilians (particularly peasants) and authorities with the aim of intimidation, sabotage of infrastructure,
etc.; (b) Guerrilla actions: assassinations and armed attacks against military and police
(often in order to gain control of land); (c) Mixed terrorist-guerrilla actions: assassinations and
attacks on members of rondas campesinas and other self-defense bodies organized in part by the
army; (d) MRTA actions, used here as contextual data; (e) Others: information on arrests, escapes,
denunciations, propaganda activities, etc.
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