International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 2020 | Page 69

International Journal on Criminology
reporting, and—fortunately—some robust studies with valuable contributions. Unfortunately,
both the disorganization that currently reigns in terrorism studies and
the objective difficulties involved—both linguistic and practical, given the conditions
of secrecy and clandestinity surrounding our object of study—have led to extreme
diversity in methodologies. This makes it difficult to compare what we know
about different organizations. But this should not stop us from drawing careful generalizations,
as long as their empirical foundations are closely examined.
Concretely, it may be argued that any research into a so-called terrorist organization
should be constructed around three main axes. The first is a firm grasp
of its history, including the analysis of the geopolitical situation (internal and external)
within which the organization emerged, the stages of its formation, the development
of its ideology, its recruitment, and its relationships with other groups,
including alliances, rivalries, and clashes. Historical research also requires us to
examine the way in which the organization constructs its repertoire of political action
(violent and/or non-violent) and to establish the role of terrorist action within
this repertoire—where “terrorism” is not a derogatory exogenous description but
designates the deliberate choice of a violent technique that meets the criteria described
above.
Next, the geographical characteristics of the organization should be examined,
using at least two complementary lines of inquiry. The first involves the spatial
distribution of specifically terrorist actions, particularly in terms of a rural/
urban divide, while taking into account the geographical characteristics (physical
and human) of the territories involved. The second involves the location(s) of
the organization, network, or wider movement, including its sanctuaries, support
bases, zones of operation, the paths along which flows (of people, orders, weapons,
money, etc.) circulate, and the at least approximate configuration of its underground
network (including hiding places, accommodation, and contacts). The
study of an organization like the SP, which has mostly been defeated, can clearly
offer researchers far more information on the matter than that of groups that are
still active.
The third and final dimension is one that is too often neglected: the systems
and strategies used by the state to tackle the organization, understood as counterterrorist
and/or counterinsurgency policies. Here, we must take into consideration
the prevailing doctrines (generally stated in handbooks, access to which may be
more or less restricted), legislation (such as repentance laws), the forces involved
(army, police, intelligence, unconventional groups, and so on), and, if possible, any
indicators of these policies’ effectiveness.
As well as these three dimensions, which are essential for building a corpus
of material for rigorous comparative research, another exercise can teach us a great
deal: the evaluation of the role and status of the organization within the field of
terrorism studies, which can be understood as a body of research (it can hardly be
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