International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 2020 | Page 61

International Journal on Criminology
for the future occupant of Brasília’s Planalto. The Brazilian Federal Police has done
remarkable work in the fight against political corruption, but its role and resources
must now, like those of the Russian FSB, be broadly extended to the areas of drug
and arms trafficking, which pay little heed to the boundaries and jurisdictions of
the federated states. It must also coordinate intelligence between the various federal
and state agencies in order to maximize their results, which at present are largely
inadequate in this area. It would also be very appropriate to involve the army in
eliminating the transit routes used by traffickers in the Amazon area, considered
to be strategic by military doctrine. Finally, the Federal Police must spearhead the
major clear-out needed within the country’s security forces.
In any event, the operation under way in Rio de Janeiro demonstrates that
the use of emergency regimes and a strong ancillary force in the event of a more
or less one-off crisis is possible in Brazil. Without being asked to take the place of
the police on a long-term basis, the Brazilian army has real expertise in the management
of urban violence, acquired during the MINUSTAH operation in Haiti
(led by Brazil from 2004 to 2017) and the successful provision of security in the
country for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. As this expertise
is further enriched, one could therefore envision a permanent operational
organization at the service of the federal executive, ready to intervene rapidly in
the event of repeated failures by local authorities to comply with public security
requirements.
With regard to prison policy, the Russian example also strikes us as extremely
relevant, since the proliferation of gangs and their active recruitment in
Brazilian prisons must be stopped as quickly as possible. It is also necessary to
restore resources and power to prison guards, who are completely helpless in the
face of overcrowding and the extreme violence of common-law prisoners. The four
federal penitentiaries that Lula established in remote and underdeveloped areas of
the country, which currently receive very few prisoners (fewer than 500), are likely
to be the model for the redevelopment of prisons in Brazil.
Reviewing the licenses of private security operators also seems highly appropriate,
and it could allow the same degree of public-private cooperation that
exists in Russia. More generally, although it is difficult to say how this can be
achieved, restoring the image of the security forces and the army and winning
back the Brazilian population’s trust in them is an essential prerequisite for reestablishing
the authority of the state. A new start is still possible, but it will require a
strict reassertion of control by the federal authorities, the firm and non-negotiable
allocation of very substantial budgets, and most likely the amendment of many
laws, and even perhaps constitutional reform.
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