International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 2020 | Page 51

International Journal on Criminology
The primary characteristic of this second wave of secularization lies in the
fact that it privileges society above the state sphere. The flourishing of the phenomenon
of people voicing their opinions outside of official and traditional forums of
expression is its most paradigmatic feature: the mobilization of the internet and
the emergence of a new intellectuality stemming from every professional sector
situate secularist aspirations in society, and no longer through the government. The
new intellectual breaks free of the sphere of intellectualism as it has conventionally
been viewed: traditionally, the intellectual was seen as an individual whose profession
consisted in the production of thoughts related to established facts, originally
circumstantial or conceptual, within a theoretical field. He or she represented a
socio-professional group. This conception imploded with the emergence of the
phenomenon of the intermediary. This phenomenon is linked to three established
facts, with the Iranian now individuated through the expression of what he or she
denies, opening up a breach in the public space: he or she uses new technologies,
seeks answers by looking beyond religious solutions, and intends to participate in
public life. The new secularization is a social dynamic that goes beyond the system
of the Islamic Republic, whose political course of action must now be developed
using tactics aiming toward permanence. This holistic system, in order to continue
to maintain a discourse that is increasingly misaligned with a society that has
succeeded in separating from it, and individuating itself, must use “makeshift”
methods to justify its continuation (project for a national internet, forfeiture of
the vote, etc.). The new core of individual subjectivity is progressing with a public
clarity, capable of using the regime’s own weapons: the absorption of the private
sphere by the public sphere has driven the individual to pursue his or her own
reflections secretly, then to express himself or herself in denial. Similarly, there
is now a clear desire on the part of the individual for the private sphere to absorb
the public sphere, and the body has become a preferred vehicle for this. Removing
one’s veil in public, for example, becomes a political demand, 31 and expressing a
sexuality that goes against the rules imposed by the Islamic Republic becomes
a sign of political identity in opposition. 32 Beyond the very latest means of telecommunications,
the new secularization is now expressed above all through the
innovative mass involvement in the public space by individuals who are “formed”
in the private sphere. Today, to display is to deny.
Present-day Iran is the result not only of the intertwining of two different
secularizing movements, but also of a three-stage process: desacralization of traditional
religion, resacralization of politicized religion, desacralization of politicized
31 See in particular the movement by Iranian women who posted photographs of themselves online
without the veil, which started in May 2014. The journalist Masih Alinejad launched this movement,
called “#MyStealthyFreedom,” from the United Kingdom, and it enjoyed widespread coverage.
32 See Eric Butel, “L’individu postislamiste en Iran : la nouvelle jeunesse,” Cahiers d’Etudes sur la Méditerranée
Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien 26 (1998), URL: http://cemoti.revues.org/37.
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