International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 2020 | Page 50

Secularization Versus Secularization: Understanding the System in the Islamic Republic of Iran
associated with mystical graces, charism, and the immateriality of the body. 28 Secularized,
the term has gradually come to include the Western concept of “dignity.”
While the 1979 revolution defended the collective honor of Iranian identity against
“Westoxification” (Islam was considered a major component of Iranian identity—
see the works of Al-Ahmad and Shariati), in 2009, Iranians wished to be recognized
as individuals with rights and a voice that could be expressed through the vote.
The deeply individuating claim of dignity thus responds to secularization
in its first sense, or even in the sense developed by Carl Schmitt, making religion
the ultimate horizon of politics: the popular demands in today’s Iran suggest an
opposition between individual opinion and the absolute truth of the velayat-e faqih,
which attests to the certainty that religion may be called into question in the
context of politics. This opposition is possible only through the recognition of the
individual’s decision-making capability and dignity. Yet, as we have seen, dignity
in all its modern aspects (philosophical, legal, bioethical) involves the secularization
of a concept that was initially religious 29 (hence the idea that religion is the ultimate
horizon of politics in a secularized society). It is in the name of this dignity
that the right to participate in political life is claimed. This position is accompanied
by a detachment from religious customs, to create consistency in the distinction
between the public and private spheres. As Farhad Khosrokhavar explains, describing
the demonstrations of 2009, “the festive atmosphere was a symbol of the
secularization, people distancing themselves from the public religious norms that
are prevalent under the Islamic regime.” 30 This distancing was expressed through
various social phenomena symptomatic of secularized societies: diversity; a greater
role for women; education as a measure of the individual’s position on the social
ladder (rather than level of devotion); lack of interest in religion, in a desire to
redefine the public sphere; and the replacement of honor by dignity.
traordinary acts that may be performed by faithful Muslims elevated to the rank of saints. Karamat
should not be confused with the miracle (mu’jizât), itself the privilege of beings escaping from the
human condition: “A miracle performed by a saint is termed karamat, i.e. a ‘favour’ which God
bestows upon him, whereas a miracle performed by a prophet is called mu’jizat, i.e. an act which
cannot be imitated by any one. The distinction originated in controversy, and was used to answer
those who held the miraculous powers of the saints to be a grave encroachment on the prerogative
of the Prophet. Sufi apologists, while confessing that both kinds of miracle are substantially the
same, take pains to differentiate the characteristics of each; they declare, moreover, that the saints
are the Prophet’s witnesses, and that all their miracles (like ‘a drop trickling from a full skin of honey’)
are in reality derived from him.” Reynold Alleyne Nicholson, The Mystics of Islam (Forgotten
Books, 2008), 95.
28 See Anne-Marie Eddé, La principauté ayyoubide d’Alep (579/1183–658/1260) (Stuttgart: Franz
Steiner Verlag, 1999), 416–8.
29 Although a concept of dignitas can be found in Ancient Roman literature, associated with honor
and charisma, the Western concept of dignity has been mainly built on the Biblical tradition and
the idea that man was created in God’s image (man resembles the Creator [Genesis 1:26], was modeled
by the divine hand [Genesis 2:7], the breath of life was breathed into his nostrils [Genesis 2:7],
and he received the command to be the steward of creation [Genesis 1:28]).
30 Khosrokhavar, “Two Types of Secularization: The Iranian Case,” 141.
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