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Why Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist Groups Pledge Allegiance to Al Qaeda or Isis
istics. Similarly, Weber contends that well-bureaucratized terrorist organizations
will be more versatile than poorly bureaucratized terrorist organizations, have
clearly identified roles and responsibilities, and have organizational strategies that
are followed closely and fulfilled in accordance with the hierarchical structure.
Therefore, even the sudden elimination of the leader will have little or no impact
on the organization’s operations. Because bureaucratization is associated with time
and experience, smaller, younger, and more ideological terrorist organizations will
be more dependent on their leaders and thus more likely to disperse after the leader
of the organization has been decapitated. Popular support helps terrorist organizations
gain access to human, logistical, and financial resources more easily and
legitimizes the group’s violent activities. Extremely violent government-sponsored
counterterrorism campaigns, however, are more likely to push local people toward
terrorist organizations and, consequently, enhance the organizations’ resilience. 55
Lindelauf and colleagues argue that terrorist organizations are more likely to
be resilient when they operate as loosely connected and scale-free networks across
the globe, which are needed to establish a balance between secrecy and functionality.
These networks are, in contrast to small-world networks, locally clustered
networks that are more vulnerable to targeted attacks. 56
Another significant determinant of organizational resilience is the geographical
location of the group’s headquarters. AQ, for example, maintains its
headquarters in the area between the porous Afghanistan and Pakistan border
(i.e., the AfPak region), an area that is quite difficult for regular armies to access to
fight a decisive war. 57 McNally and Weinbaum argue that after the 9/11 attacks in
2001, AQ restructured into a decentralized organization that consisted of an elite
core of three hundred individuals located in the Afpak region and several loosely
connected branches spread across the world. AQ’s elite core is relatively small,
which enables it to quickly relocate to the other side of the border when faced with
problems on the side it had been occupying. Not content with the status quo, AQ’s
elite core has been consolidating its power in the AfPak region by cooperating
with the Taliban against official governments in the region and uniting defragmented
jihadist groups. 58
The literature on terrorist organization resilience generally underscores
organizational variables (such as organizational structure, ideology, and network
type) as the main factors that enable terrorist organizations to withstand disrup-
55 Jordan, “Attacking the Leader Missing the Mark.”
56 R. Lindelauf, P.E.M. Borm, and H.J.M. Hamers, “Understanding Terrorist Network Topologies and
Their Resilience Against Disruption,” Center Discussion Paper; Vol. 2009-85. Tilburg: Operations
Research.
57 B. Sude, “Assessing Al-Qaeda Central’s Resilience,” CTS Sentinel 8, no. 11 (2015).
58 L. McNally and M.G. Weinbaum, “A Resilient Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Middle East
Institute Publication (2016), https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF18_Weinbaum
_AQinAFPAK_web_1.pdf.
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