International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 2020 | Page 22

Why Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist Groups Pledge Allegiance to Al Qaeda or Isis
ess well defined, the result is an “integrated” partnership. 20 When one of the parties
is dependent upon the other, the result is a “subordinate” affiliation. Resources
flow from the patron organization to the subordinate organization, and the patron
organization incorporates the subordinate organization into its ideological sphere
until a specified termination date and dissolution of the affiliation. 21 Finally, a “reciprocal”
alliance refers to a temporal and transactional partnership where both
parties maintain their own resources and authority and come together for a short
period to realize a common objective. 22 Bacon emphasizes that trust is the cement
of alliances between terrorist organizations. 23
In sum, although certain drawbacks exist, terrorist organizations still form
alliances and, in the case of AQ and ISIS, alliances occur when local terrorist
groups pledge allegiance to one of these larger organizations. Mutual organizational
interests and strategies are the primary motivators of alliance-seeking behaviors
among terrorist organizations, according to the bulk of the literature on
the subject. Moghadam alone mentions enhanced resilience as a motivator for the
formation of terrorist-group alliances, and he does so only from the perspective of
the larger organization involved in the alliance. Nevertheless, as it is elaborated on
below, this study posits that smaller organizations pledge allegiance to larger ones
to ensure their resilience in the event of existential organizational traumas.
New Trends in Al Qaeda
AQ was established by Usama bin Laden in 1988 to move jihad against the
Western world to a global dimension after the end of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. 24 “Al-Qaida’s tenure as an alliance hub can be roughly divided
into four periods based on its environment and alliance behavior: (1) a jihadist
facilitator during the anti-Soviet jihad, which predated al-Qaida’s formation as an
organization; (2) a jihadist lender in Sudan from 1991 to 1996; (3) a terrorist provider
in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001; and (4) a terrorist brand name from 2002
to present.” 25
AQ has had a different organizational mindset from ISIS from the outset
in terms of being directly established in the conflict area, fighting at that time
against the Soviet Union, which was then one of the two hegemonic powers of the
world, together with the US, and recruiting warriors from various nations across
the world. 26 Having defeated a superpower in Afghanistan, bin Laden declared
20 Bacon, 754.
21 Bacon, 754.
22 Bacon, 755.
23 Bacon, 759.
24 T. McCormick, “Al Qaeda Core: A Short History,” Foreign Policy, March 17, 2014.
25 Bacon, 322.
26 M. Mohamedou, “Al Qaeda’s Matrix,” in A Theory of ISIS: Political Violence and the Transformation
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