International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 2020 | Page 21

International Journal on Criminology
small organizations allow the larger organization to reach a broader market, as
the smaller organizations use the larger organization’s brand name and reputation
to facilitate its operations. Such alliances also enable the smaller organizations to
build legitimacy in the eyes of their followers. 14
Byman asserts that the primary motives for smaller terrorist organizations
to seek alliance with larger organizations include (1) failure to achieve organizational
goals, (2) loss of popular support and manpower, (3) the ability to obtain
financial, logistical, educational, and human resources, (4) the need for a safe
haven from perceived enemies, (5) the opportunity to gain experience in armed
conflict, (6) the desire to ensure the general defense of the smaller group, (7) the
ability to benefit from the brand value of a more prominent organization, and (8)
the establishment of personal networks. 15 On the other hand, the establishment of
affiliations with smaller terrorist organizations may be attractive to larger terrorist
organizations, such as AQ or ISIS. Smaller organizations can be used to expand
a larger organization’s presence geographically, enhance organizational resilience
and strength when the larger organization is faced with intensive counterinsurgency
campaigns, and provide logistical support and additional manpower. 16 ISIS,
for example, has used the many pledges of allegiance it has received from smaller
terrorist organizations to build a reputation as the leading jihadist organization in
the world, attract more foreign human resources, and wage attacks nearly every
geographical corner of the world. 17
Moghadam emphasizes mutual organizational interests with respect to affiliation
between terrorist organizations. According to Moghadam, terrorist groups
seek alliances to achieve “process goals,” the logistical and personnel aspects of the
organization, and “outcome goals,” which pertain to organizational ideology and
motivation. 18
Bacon identifies four types of affiliation between terrorist organizations
based on how resources are shared, how the partners foresee the duration of the
alliance, the parties’ respective degree of power, and the scope and terms of the
partnership. When resources are shared and the parties do not foresee a termination
date for the partnership, the organizations become almost dependent upon
each other and the boundaries of authority are eliminated. The result is a “pooled”
alliance. 19 When the sharing of resources and the absence of a termination date are
14 Byman, “Buddies or Burdens?” 442.
15 D. Byman, “Breaking the Bonds Between Al Qaeda and its Affiliate Organizations,” Brookings Institution
Analysis Paper Number 27 (2012): iv-v.
16 Byman, “Breaking the Bonds.”
17 A. Moghadam, “Terrorist Affiliations in Context: A Typology of Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation,”
CTS Sentinel 8, no. 3 (2015).
18 Moghadam, Nexus of Global Jihad.
19 Bacon, 753.
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