International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 2020 | Page 20

Why Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist Groups Pledge Allegiance to Al Qaeda or Isis
fidentiality and, therefore, the general security of both parties. 9 Thus, the question
is why terrorist organizations form alliances in the presence of such serious
drawbacks. The subject matter has been examined extensively in the literature and
mostly similar conclusions have been reached.
Asal and colleagues, for example, studied the alliance-forming behaviors
among 395 terrorist groups between 1998 and 2005. They find that the allianceseeking
behaviors of terrorist groups are multidimensional and involve a set of
organizational, environmental, and situational factors. Asal and colleagues also
found find that older terrorist organizations that pursue a jihadist ideology and
control a certain geographical region in countries with small military forces are
more likely to establish alliances with other organizations. The researchers further
contend that a common ideology and common motivation, a shared enemy, and
organizational factors, such as the age and geographical origin of the respective
organizations, are the most notable elements of groups that form alliances. 10
Using a similar approach, Philips examined 236 cases of alliance among terrorist
groups between 1987 and 2005 from a monadic perspective, as opposed to
the dyadic approach found in most of the literature on alliance formation. Philips
finds that being sovereign in a certain region and having a religious motivation are
the most important factors involved in the alliance-forming behaviors of terrorist
groups. He also finds that state support of terrorist-group alliances is important at
the international level and that intermediate size organizations are more predisposed
to forming alliances. 11
From an organizational standpoint, one would expect that organizational
affiliations between terrorist groups would be the exception rather than the rule
and that such affiliations would occur only in limited settings. 12 This reasoning
would explain why only a few terrorist groups establish partnerships and why certain
organizations become the focal point, or “alliance hub,” of such networks. The
establishment of networks with other terrorist organizations comes with advantages
for smaller groups that have suffered serious damage to their organizations.
Large terrorist organizations tend to be more resilient to government counterterrorism
measures, which provides smaller groups with considerable legitimacy,
reliability, and status while acting under the auspices of larger terrorist organizations.
13 In a similar organizational approach, partnerships between large and
Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 11 (2018).
9 A. Moghadam, Nexus of Global Jihad: Understanding Cooperation among Terrorist Actors (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2017).
10 V. Asal et al., “With Friends Like These: Why Terrorist Organizations Ally,” International Public
Management Journal 19, no.1 (2016), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254066517_With_
Friends_Like_These_Why_Terrorist_Organizations_Ally/link/555f2e9e08ae6f4dcc90bc5b/down
load.
11 Phillips, “Terrorist Group Rivalries and Alliances.”
12 Asal et al., 16.
13 Bacon, “Strange Bedfellows or Brothers in Arms.”
11