International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 2020 | Page 19

International Journal on Criminology
ISIS. The final section of the paper presents the conclusions and recommendations
for future research.
Methodology
The study that forms the basis for this paper defines “pledging allegiance”
as declaring loyalty and being affiliated to any large terrorist organization.
The study examines allegiance to Salafi-jihadist organizations such as AQ
and ISIS because an increasing number of jihadist groups operating in different
parts of the world are declaring loyalty to these two major terrorist organizations.
The analysis covers forty-three terrorist groups that perpetrated at least one terrorist
attack in 2018. Some of these groups declared their loyalty to AQ or ISIS
before 2018. The perpetrator terrorist organization’s declaration of loyalty to either
of these major organizations as reported in the media is considered evidence of
pledging allegiance.
Causes and Effects of Affiliation among Terrorist Groups
AQ and ISIS have given the structure of traditional terrorism a much sophisticated
and versatile dimension by establishing partnerships with several
local terrorist groups around the world through the Bay’a (pledge of
allegiance) mechanism. Bay’a refers to an Islamic institution where one party officially
acknowledges and submits to the authority of another. The concept has deep
roots in Islam, starting with the Prophet Mohammed, and has been maintained
since then by his successors. 4 In the context of terrorism, “a ‘terrorist affiliate’ is a
terrorist organization that accepts the leadership of another terrorist organization,
but remains organizationally distinct. 5 ” ISIS, for example, has expanded its caliphate
by gaining territory and accepting the pledges of alliance from several local
terrorist groups around the world. 6
Obviously, there are drawbacks to forming alliances with terrorist groups.
First of all, establishing a partnership with a larger organization means compromising
on organizational authority. 7 Second, the partnership makes smaller organizations
more vulnerable to government counterterrorism campaigns. Third,
there is no guarantee that either of the partners will abide by the rules of the partnership.
8 Finally, the network cannot be extended without compromising the con-
4 D. Milton and M. Al-Ubaydi, “Pledging Bay’a: A Benefit or Burden to the Islamic State?” CTS Sentinel
8, no. 3 (2015): 2.
5 D. Byman, “Buddies or Burdens? Understanding the Al Qaeda Relationship with Its Affiliate Organizations,”
Security Studies 23, no. 3 (2014): 434.
6 Milton and Al-Ubaydi, 2-3.
7 T. Bacon, “Strange Bedfellows or Brothers in Arms: Why Terrorist Groups Ally,” (PhD dissertation,
Georgetown University, 2013).
8 B.J. Phillips, “Terrorist Group Rivalries and Alliances: Testing Competing Explanations,” Studies in
10