International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 2020 | Page 18

Why Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist Groups Pledge Allegiance to Al Qaeda or Isis
aratist groups and Salafi-jihadist groups. According to the 2018 Statistical Annex
Report from the US State Department, terrorist organizations were responsible for
more than 8,000 attacks in 2018, leaving around 23,000 people dead and almost
33,000 others wounded. 1 Among these myriad organizations, the most active ones
were Salafi-jihadist groups, which operate across a broader geographical area than
other terrorist groups. In the report’s ranking of terrorist groups by the number
of terrorist attacks, jihadist organizations held the top four spots. The Global Terrorism
and Trends Analysis Center (GTTAC) database for the same year recorded
1,079 attacks by the Taliban, 647 attacks by ISIS, 535 attacks by Al Shabab, and 220
attacks by Boko Haram. The attacks by jihadist groups accounted for 81% of the
top-ten known perpetrator groups with the most incidents in the same year. 2
This paper examines the reasons that jihadist groups pledge allegiance to either
Al Qaeda (AQ) or ISIS. Using media sources, the paper analyzes active jihadist
groups involved in terrorist attacks in 2018. In the last few years, Salafi-jihadist
groups have shown an increasing desire to affiliate with large terrorist organizations.
When military raids by states pursuing counterterrorism campaigns weaken
jihadist groups by killing their leaders or eliminating a considerable part of their
militants, these organizations experience vital organizational problems, ranging
from restructuring to dissolution, and therefore tend to pledge allegiance to and/
or affiliate with large organizations as part of strategy of resilience and survival.
The well-known brand names and popularity of AQ and ISIS have enabled these
two groups to expand their numbers and reach despite the long-standing efforts of
the world’s superpowers to eliminate both of them. That resiliency turned AQ and
ISIS into highly attractive shelters for several jihadist groups that faced grave organizational
problems and threats to their survival. In 2018, for example, jihadist
groups in twenty-six countries preferred to declare loyalty to ISIS, while jihadist
groups in fifteen counties affiliated with AQ. 3
This paper is organized as follows: First, the methodology of the paper is explained,
then the matter of affiliation among terrorist organizations is addressed,
with a specific focus on AQ and ISIS, followed by an examination of new trends
in each of AQ and ISIS. In the section on trends, the current strategies of the two
terrorist organizations are analyzed without getting into much detail about the
well-known historical phases these organizations. Next, the theoretical basis for
the paper is laid out, including a discussion about resilience in terrorist organizations
and the introduction of resilience theory, which was adapted by the authors
to the resilience-seeking behaviors of terrorist organizations. This theoretical basis
is then applied to organizations that have recently pledged allegiance to AQ or
1 “Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terrorism,” United States State Department,
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/DSG-Statistical-Annex-2018.pdf.
2 “Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terrorism,” 5.
3 “Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terrorism,” 9.
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