International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 2020 | Page 125

International Journal on Criminology
and the Trotskyists, including Ben Bella).
Furthermore, as seen above, the marginalization of children cannot be reduced
to a mere lack of bearings that is also solely linked to the economic situation.
First, because it is not a question of their having lost their way, as seen in the
previous two examples and in the personal testimony of Lawrence Madzou, but
rather of an ambivalence between two systems of bearings. Second, and in relation
to economic immigration proper, Daniel Lefeuvre (2006, 158) clearly shows
that “contrary to the myth, French employers did not go over to recruit Algerian
workers,” and describes a veritable scam orchestrated by a number of conmen in
Algeria who used the promise of a better life to lure over a workforce that was
judged by employers—for example from 1920 to 1962—to be “rather unstable and
insufficiently productive.” In contrast, between 1945 and 1953 Moroccan workers
were “much praised, and constituted a valued and sought-after workforce” (Lefeuvre
2006, 159), which directly undercuts the argument of racism, although this
can indeed be identified in some cases (Lefeuvre 2006, 159). Lefeuvre thus asks:
“How do we explain the paradox of a workforce made to come over being hit by mass
unemployment? In 1953, 115,000 of the 220,000 Algerians in France were unemployed,
at a time when the official statistics recorded a total of 179,000 unfilled posts”
(Lefeuvre 2006, 159). Lefeuvre primarily explains immigration as a result of the
demographic boom and the country’s limited economic development “at a time
when the colonial system hindered opportunities for industrializing the colony and
for bold agrarian reform” (Lefeuvre 2006, 170 et seq.). 26
Let us therefore consider the idea that, once it had thus become the provider
for family still in their home country—Lefeuvre (2006, 174) also demonstrates that
immigration to France was seen by politicians at the time as the way to maintain
peace in Algeria—this population then stayed in France, even after independence
in 1962, because it had a better standard of living there. However, in some cases,
this was experienced as a certain political spirit of non-integration, in the sense of
opting for voluntary non-integration due to the possibility of return. This involved
not adopting, in the meantime, values and most importantly behaviors—such as
the gradual emancipation of women—that were considered to be contrary to tradition,
including Islamic values.
Another hypothesis to be considered is that, after 1962, when Algerian natives
took Algerian nationality but stayed in France, and when they perceived that
their new country was far from improving the situation at home, a multiform dissonance
(discrepancy) emerged—as with some African nationals—in the sense of
an increasingly painful tug between two value systems. This will be explored further
in the next section.
26 For a fuller analysis of the agricultural issues, see Goinard 2001, 138–67.
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