International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 1, Winter 2019/2020 | Page 85

International Journal on Criminology
a new cocaine trafficking hub from South America to Europe. Guinea-Bissau was
further described as “an interesting case in point because indications [were] that
this country [was] particularly utilised by traffickers” (UNODC 2007, 10). As one
of the poorest in the subregion, “the entire national budget of the government of
Guinea-Bissau is just about equal to the wholesale value of 2.5 tons of cocaine in
Europe” (UNODC 2007, 12), consisting of many small islands with their own landing
strips, and ruled by low-paid and easily corruptible officials, Guinea-Bissau
logically became pushers’ paradise (Hanson 2007). The coercive power of Mafias to
keep control of their own state was highlighted by South American cartels’ logistical
and financial support both to Guinea-Bissau president’ elections and to multiple
military coups, notably in April 2012 (United Nations Security Council 2012).
Among other notorious drug-lords, Vice-Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto and two of his
followers were arrested by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and later indicted
for their involvement in narcotics trafficking (Valdamanis and Andrade 2013).
3.2. The Geopolitical Power of Mafias
In addition to their national political influence, Mafias’ direct participation in international
affairs encompasses several dimensions. Yet, the power of Mafias as
geopolitical actors is especially visible in war zones around the world.
3.2.1. A Determining Role in Conflicts
Mafias thrive in conflict, and more broadly in politically or economically instable
context. New transnational criminal organizations are sometimes created in the
aftermath of a conflict, such as NCS after the Biafra war (1967–1970). Mafias benefit
indeed from these troubled periods to recruit cheap labor force, to provide governance
in deprived areas, and to extend their illicit trafficking (bootlegging, drug
markets, prostitution, etc.). The Vietnam War and its aftermath saw the booming
of heroin trafficking and consumption, notably in the United States (Collins
1993). Implemented in the region since the Indochina war, Corsican mobsters
(the French Connection) allied with U.S. Cosa Nostra’ Families and CIA officials,
created the Golden Triangle, the world’s largest heroin production region (Kelly
1999). Similar schemes have allowed heroin trafficking to thrive in Afghanistan
(Collins 1993).
Furthermore, in Sahel’s conflict zones, in Afghanistan and Sudan, a progressive
delegation of sovereign powers to criminal organizations by local authorities
against shares of illicit revenues has considerably reinforced criminals’ wealth and
political power (Lacher 2012). Uncontested masters of large territories, criminals
are able to blackmail governments through their proximity to terrorist organizations
or as the main local economic actor (Sebastian 2015). Consequently, powerful
criminals become indispensable partners in peace-making processes, while
war’ continuation is often in their best personal interest (Margolis 2008).
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