International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 1, Winter 2019/2020 | Page 83

International Journal on Criminology
The political—criminal symbiosis has many faces. One side of the coin is the criminalization
of high-level public officials, i.e. their direct participation in criminal
activity as highlighted in UNODC reports on West and Central African regions
(UNODC 2013). In his research, Stephen Ellis also describes Nigerian politicians’
participation in large criminal networks notably fee-fraud, human smuggling,
and narcotics trafficking (Ellis 2015). On another aspect of this political—criminal
symbiosis was emphasized by Jim Woolsey, a former CIA Director, using the
example of several former Soviet satellite states, where organized crime groups
started to work as complementary to Nation-States’ structures, “doing everything
that was not acceptable from a government” (Cockayne 2016, 3).
Broadly speaking, Mafias use this political strategy when they do not have
structural capabilities (manpower or finances) to control a territory on their own.
It is, however, noticeable that Mafias have successfully developed a political—
criminal nexus, i.e. the sharing of governmental power with local political forces,
in every type of political regime and socio-economic environment. Even repressive
societies are not exempted. North Korea’s state budget is indeed decisively
dependent on the trading of narcotics, notably methamphetamine, to Triads and
Yakuzas (Glenny 2009). In fact, Mafias are intrinsically interlinked with several
Nation-States’ histories, notably Cuba and Turkey, in the following case studies.
A classic historical example is given by the U.S. Cosa Nostra support to
Batista’s coup in Cuba in 1952 (Cockayne 2016). In return for their support, a
governing joint venture was created allowing the Cosa Nostra to run illicit and
licit gambling, prostitution, and narco-trafficking in the country. Cuban State’ resources
were allocated to facilitate these illicit businesses: favorable legislation was
passed, banks were created, and security forces provided. Leading politicians such
as the Prio Socarras brothers, at the time Prime Minister and Senator amassed fortunes
(Cockayne 2016). The joint venture notably established Aerovias Q, a commercial
airline entitled to use military airports and to avoid customs, which played
a central role in shipping cocaine from Colombia to Camaguey (Cuba) where it
was refined before being sent to the United States.
The fascinating political–criminal nexus in modern Turkey illustrates how
necessity and leader’s greed brought a Nation-State’s ruling elite to seek an alliance
with a Mafia, which greatly expanded thanks to this growing collusion of means,
objectives, and interests. Following WW2, Turkish Mafia bosses or Baba (father)
considerably increased territorial control, both in cities and in the countryside,
thanks to growing revenues from heroin trafficking. Their support became vital to
politicians, businessmen, and security forces during periods of serious instability
such as in the 1970s and 1980s when the country was close to chaos (Ülkütekin
2014). Facing armed opposition from Kurdish, Marxist, or Armenians’ movements,
the military and police establishments turned to a young nationalist’ movement
called Ulkucu or Grey Wolves, led by Abdallah Catli. Quickly allied with
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