International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 1, Winter 2019/2020 | Page 78

Criminal Networks: The Forgotten Actors of International Politics
seau’s notion of representation, as notably emphasized in his essay Considerations
on the Government of Poland (Held 2000). In fact, Mafias are self-centered actors
whose lure for power is inherently a selfish quest erasing every possible obstacle,
contrary even to the notion of social contracts and democratic principles. Its vitality
and legitimization come from its own ranks, none of its objectives or means of
actions are dictated from outside its structure (Gayraud 2011).
2.2.2. Nation-States’ and Mafias Conflicting Core Attributes
International Law requirements of statehood are set out in Article 1 of the 1933
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. Required criteria include
a permanent population; a defined territory; a government and the ability to
enter into relations with other Nation-States. Each of these Nation-States constitutive
elements is interestingly contested by Mafias.
Mafias’ most visible challenge to Nation-States’ governmental power lies in
its constant capacity to neutralize States’ responses and attempts to dismantle it or
to diminish durably its power and resources. In fact, Mafias infiltration of public
structures, especially judicial systems and law enforcement, is the key as it directly
implies that they cannot be durably repressed without affecting local, regional, or
national elites (Cockayne 2016). Many Nation-States first fail to subject Mafias
to their own rules. For instance, while being on all European polices most-wanted
criminal’ lists, Cosa Nostra capo de capi Toto Riina and Bernardo Provenzano
have succeeded, respectively, for over two and four decades to expand their Mafias’
power. However, Mafias do not only neutralize Nation-States’ legitimate use of
force but they also impose their own coercive governmental authority.
In fact, Mafias run a parallel tax’ collection system which according to Weber
constitutes one of the most ancient Nation-States’ attributes of power (Held 2000).
Hence, it is noticeable that racketeering, i.e. protection against a real or imaginary
security threat, is a basic source of all Mafia’s wealth. Cosa Nostra repentant’ Antonio
Calderone describes the racketeering system run by pizzo, Cosa Nostra tax
collector, as being the most visible sign of a territory being under Mafias’ rule and of
citizens’ subordination to its authority (Ziniti 2017). In fact, every legal (commerce,
construction, etc.) and illegal (gambling, thefts) economic activity will be taxed and
transformed into sources of revenues. A recent study of the Italian small business
confederation (Confesercenti) highlighted that 80% of shops in Sicilia and 50% in
Napoli are paying their taxes to Mafias which earn over $60 billion euros annually
from this activity alone (Gayraud 2011). In Japan, sokaiya, i.e. Yakuza facilitators,
are allegedly racketeering companies such as Toyota, Japan Airlines, or Takashimaya
for annual profits estimated at several billion dollars (Grennan and Britz 2006).
Finally, like Nation-States, Mafias are profoundly anchored in the social and
historical realities of the territory they originate from. It is arguable that the territory
is a part of a Mafia’s biotope (Reski 2013). The Mafia territory is first its historic
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