International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 1, Winter 2019/2020 | Page 49

International Journal on Criminology
threat to the infrastructure of the developed countries. This point, rarely addressed
in our equivocal approach to cyberdefense, is a very important one. It may best be
illustrated by imagining the scene shortly after a successful blitz attack on the critical
energy infrastructure of a typical modern country. With all such infrastructure
now one hundred percent computerized, the country is effectively unplugged and
in meltdown before the first shot is fired, resulting in:
• deletion of crucial data
• theft of sensitive information
• paralysis of critical infrastructure
• diminished military capability
• no electrical power for offices and homes
• no telecom services, cell-phone networks, or internet access
• no emergency services or law enforcement
• no trains or subways
• non-functioning equipment in hospitals and medical centers
• no traffic lights
• no financial networks, card payments, or ATMs
• no gas at gas stations
• bank accounts are inaccessible
• no control of hydraulic dams, wind farms, or solar farms
• closure of wastewater treatment plants (domestic and industrial)
• no way of calling the police (leading to riots and mass looting)
• no refrigerators and no supply chain to supermarkets (with food supplies used
up within a week)
According to one expert, “[t]o hackers like these, we are like Bambi in the
woods.” At the very least, the United States, Russia, and China have the ability to
mount such attacks, any response to which is rendered impossible: in cyberspace,
there is no such thing as deterrence.
When hackers are detected in a critical network, they no longer run away
like they did in the past, politely closing the door behind them. Now, they dig in
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