International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 1, Winter 2019/2020 | Page 113

International Journal on Criminology
fadayin-e khalq. 13 This communist group was vehemently opposed both to the regime
of the Shah and subsequently to the Islamic Republic, which, seeing them as
a substantial threat, proceeded to make arrests and order executions on a massive
scale. These former communists explained that, due to their nationalism, some of
them (especially the fadayin-e khalq for whom the world of armed struggle was
much more familiar) asked to be freed in order to fight the Iraqi enemy, “to leave
in order to lose their lives, at a time when ideals were to the fore. We refused to
be martyrs of the Islamic Republic, but our attitude was to die in support of our
people. Now, few are still prepared to die for an ideal. When I say few, I am talking
about the Iranian people, not only us, the former fadayin.” 14
These remarks are interesting insofar as they enable us to grasp two vital
phenomena in understanding martyrdom: the first, a practical point, concerns
why the Iranian population is no longer ready to die in the name of the sacred on
an overwhelming scale. It is now only a minority that engages in this way, a minority
that maintains a heroic image in the eyes of the population in the new context
of conflict with takfiri political movements. For example, General Soleimani
is popular and videos circulated on the Internet show him in Syria, surrounded
by the sound of bombing, without a helmet, without protection, ready to risk his
life, but without looking for death. Death is fundamental to the statement made
by these videos, but is not the aim. Disillusionment with the post-revolutionary
period, and especially with the aftermath of the Iran–Iraq war, has unraveled the
ideological mentality making way for a nationalization crystallized by the demonization
of Iran by the Saudis, neo-conservatives, and the rise of Sunni Islamic
ideologies.
A second phenomenon is the view that Iran has entered the postmodern
era. Having borne the brunt of holistic ideologies, and seen them fail, the population
can no longer envisage dying in the name of an ideal, whatever it may be. The
question of martyrdom is new and updated insofar as it seems to consist of both a
battle against a postmodernist population that is disillusioned by mass movements
(in Iran) and, in the case of new form of jihad like that of ISIS, modernist aspirations
that are busy constructing a globalizing ideology that is driven by ideals and
their finality in death. In this respect, the formation in 2015 of the Babylon Brigade
in Iraq is an instructive example. This group of 800 Christian volunteer combatthat
silenced them, the party reappeared on the public scene, but once the Islamic Republic was
established, a purge of members of the party began. Thousands of militants were arrested. Ayatollah
Khalkhali (known as the “hanging judge”) sent a large number of them to the gallows. In 1982, the
party leadership was imprisoned.
13 The fadayin-e khalq of the Iranian people was a clandestine Marxist–Leninist organization founded
in the 1970s that resorted to guerrilla tactics.
14 Interview with a member of a family, 11 of whom were imprisoned during the Iran–Iraq war for
their leftist beliefs, conducted during an inquiry into the link between disenchantment and entry
into postmodernity.
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