International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 1, Winter 2019/2020 | Page 110

Martyropathy in the Sunni and Shiite Worlds: A Comparative Study
Fahmideh was reused in 2010 during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, in the
context of a “populationist” policy. Sadegh Mahsouli, Minister of Welfare and Social
Security, gave a speech on April 16, 2010, when he explicitly called on Iranian
families to have more children who could become new Hossein Fahmidehs, ready
to die for their country. He said: “Children must be educated so that when they
reach the age of thirteen they will be capable of imitating Hossein Fahmideh.” 7
Later, with the development of ISIS, the targets of Sunni jihadism changed.
Now, according to takfiri logic, the Shiite was enemy number one. Before, jihadist
groups such as Al-Qaeda saw the Jew or the Crusader as the enemy. Now, in
the first instance, it is the Shiite that is demonized and marked out as a usurper
of Islam, and therefore even more deserving of condemnation than those who,
as infidels (Jews or Christian Crusaders), merely represent established figures of
historical and civilizational domination. Iran is therefore in the firing line, as it
embodies the model for political Shi’ism and is the great protector of Shiite populations
worldwide. It was in this context that the figure of the Shiite martyr in the
service of Iran was reborn. The state revived the martyrdom-loving ideological
motivations drawn up three centuries earlier to fight this new power that aimed to
eradicate the Shiite. The Islamic Republic defined the profile of a new type of martyr,
the shahid modafe-ye haram, that is, “the martyr who protects the mausoleum.”
This is a reference to the mausoleum of Zainab, daughter of Ali, which is enclosed
within the Shiite Al-Sayeda Zainab Mosque in Damascus in Syria. Beyond
the political interests that revived the figure of the martyr, the stated reason (the
protection of sacred sites) is real and resonates with some who were mobilized.
In July 2014, ISIS’s destruction of the tomb of Jonah (an important figure in the
Abrahamic faiths) in Mosul deeply traumatized people in the Middle East. We
should also remember that Zainab’s mausoleum itself was subsequently the target
for several attacks, as were a number of other religious sites in Damascus including
the Shiite Bab al-Saghir cemetery, the March 11, 2017, attack that was claimed by
a former branch of Al-Qaeda, the Fateh al-Sham front. This attack killed 74, and
was targeted at Shiite pilgrims, most of whom were Iraqi. Iran committed itself
to opposing takfirism and becoming a model protector by calling for the defense
of all sites sacred to all religions. The technique is therefore the same: political
necessity is cloaked in religious rhetoric, invoking the sacred cause of the defense
of the faith in order to defend, in the first instance, the nation and the Shiite communities’
sacred sites, as well as those of other communities. Iran then swelled its
forces against takfirism by recruiting Afghans who dreamed of Iranian nationality.
In return for their sacrifice for “the defense of the mausoleum,” combatants were
promised that their families would be granted nationality. According to Human
Rights Watch, martyrdom was revived in this way in 2013, principally to mobilize
7 Our translation. See the report of his speech on the BBC Persian Service website, 27 farvardin
1389/April 16, 2010 (in Persian):http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2010/04/100416_l06_
mahsouli_fahmide_.shtml.
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