International Journal on Criminology Volume 7, Number 1, Winter 2019/2020 | Page 87

International Journal on Criminology
levich was the “real power” behind his own multi-billion gas interests (Harding
2010). Russian authorities arrested Mogilevich in 2008 over tax evasion at a cosmetics
chain, but mysteriously released him in 2009 (Wallace and Mesko 2013).
Finally, a detailed field-investigation conducted by the C4ADS foundation,
and published in September 2013, highlighted the role of the Odessa Network, a
criminal joint venture gathering high-level politicians and militaries close to Russian
President Vladimir Putin (notably one of his personal advisors), oligarchs as
well as the Russian Bratva, in fuelling the conflicts in Syria, Somalia, Sudan, or
République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) by selling weapons to local armed
groups on behalf of the Russian and Ukrainian governments.
3.2.3. Mafias’ Wars
Not only thanks to its economic and logistical participation but also through its
ability to control local actors, I would argue that Mafias have built the capacity to
manipulate and start conflicts according to their own interests. During conflicts,
Mafias can serve insurgent groups through intelligence support, territorial control,
assassinations, and, especially, the establishment of efficient production and distribution
of goods and services. In fact, Mafias are often necessary and preferred
commercial partners to warlords (UNSC 2015). The example of Cote d’Ivoire underlines
that revenues of gold, diamonds, manganese, cotton, timber, or cocoa trafficking
allowed local warlords to sustain their rebellion but also to considerably enrich
and later gain access to high-level administrative or military positions (UNSC
2007). Hence, Mafias strategically choose to support rebellions and to manipulate
conflicts to acquire present and future economic and political gains.
Moreover, Mafias have attained the geopolitical capacity to project force, its
coercive power, beyond its traditional zones of influences to its best interests. In
fact, the Peruvian “Shining path” rebellion has allegedly been rebooted by Mexican
cartels and became a puppet cocaine-smuggling armed group (Rodolfo 1999). The
Sinaloa, Beltran Leyva, and Gulf cartels have succeeded in transforming the Valley
of the Apurimac and Ene Rivers (VRAE), a lawless outpost in eastern Andes that
now grows more coca plants than anywhere else on Earth and from where they
supply the Brazilian market, the second in the world after the United States (Tegel
2014).
Mafias’ ability to launch or develop a conflict depending on their local interests
was also perceptible during the recent Balkan wars where criminal groups
thrived by selling drugs, weapons, oil, clothes, food, migrants, and information,
sometimes also participating directly in combats, notably during the siege of Sarajevo
(Gayraud 2011). Indispensable post-conflict partners, Albanian clans acquired
unparalleled political and mediatic power in the post-communism institutional
void (Glenny 2009). It is, therefore, no surprise that the Albanese Mafia
developed a new stronghold in Kosovo following the footsteps of NATO. The
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