International Journal on Criminology Volume 6, Number 2, Winter 2018/Spring 2019 | Page 69

International Journal on Criminology
the newly created EEZs. Other countries established autonomous operating systems
in international waters, allowing resupply on the ocean and cargo transfers
(Taiwan, former Soviet Union, Thailand). The capacity of ships flying the national
flag in the national (or European) space was reduced, but the economic operators
still owned that capacity and had transferred it elsewhere. In Europe, this situation
was found in particular with Spanish operators in the distant-water fishing sector.
Some activities could also be maintained in the framework of fishing agreements,
but those developed by the EU with other countries now take the problems of
overcapacity into account. Today, transfers reregistering under a new flag are encouraged
over the accessing of fishing areas through licenses .
The current landscape of global overcapacity, through activities related to
distant-water fishing under the national flag or other flags, is structured around
very internationalized overcapacity countries and the areas that receive this overcapacity.
The hubs of overcapacity are China (since the 1990s), Taiwan, Thailand,
Russia, Spain, probably Iran and Cambodia, and very recently Vietnam 9 (due to
a very ambitious modernization plan). These hubs of overcapacity take the form
of economic interests and not necessarily country flags. The hubs that receive this
overcapacity are the Central-West Pacific, the Indian Ocean, all the African coasts,
and the South Atlantic. In these receiving zones, various mechanisms of crime are
underway: obtaining fishing licenses through corruption, using workers in conditions
of forced labor, not returning crews to port, illicit transshipment on the
ocean, fishing protected species, exceeding fishing quotas, not respecting national
technical regulations, and finally illegal fishing (operating in fishing zones without
access rights). These sectors have seen the development of hybridizations, which
are discussed in the first article of this special issue on maritime crime.
Overcapacity in Commercial Fleets
It is no easier to measure the overcapacity of commercial fleets. Theoretically,
this measurement can be made by comparing transportation capacity with the
volumes to be transported. Yet as a global measurement, the diversity of volumes
to be transported and the levels of specialization by freight type make it a
complex calculation. It is therefore necessary to combine objective measurements
with the impressions of economic operators. The global data available for long
time series is aggregated by UNCTAD. 10 For commercial fleets, three segments
are individualized: ships transporting oil (tanks) 11 ; bulk carriers, for dry bulk; and
container ships. These three categories will therefore be examined in this analysis.
9 This modernization plan for Vietnam both relates to overuse of its coastal waters, justifying the development
of a long-distance fleet, and serves as a statement of its sovereignty in the face of pressure
from China and the Philippines in the South China Sea.
10 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
11 The sector calls them “tankers.” This segment is made up of different types of ships that transport
66