International Journal on Criminology Volume 6, Number 2, Winter 2018/Spring 2019 | Page 66

The Toxicity of Maritime Overcapacity
with a view to reducing costs. In the maritime context, this results in a race for
giant ships, ports, and the creation of alliances between maritime operators. In a
situation of oligopolistic concentration, however, it is in no one’s interest to maintain
this overcapacity for too long. And the oligopoly aspect makes it so that all
the actors then fight to reduce this situation. They will have a sufficient financial
base and will benefit from the certitude of a return on investment. This is therefore
a transitory situation that temporarily immobilizes overcapacity (empty ships, at
anchor for long periods), or finances the dismantling of ships, even if this at a loss
and even if these ships are still relatively new. 2
The next situation is the complete opposite and is when the actors are very
disparate and there is no regulation of maximum capacity. In the maritime context,
this situation is found in some segments that are subject to speculator investment
at several levels of profitability, which are independent in terms of the
choices of those involved, but which lead to the construction of new capacities.
There is investment: in construction because the shipyards receive aid and the
shipyard sector as such is presumed to be profitable; and/or in the ship because
the ship in itself is presumed to be profitable; and/or because the ship can benefit
from attractive seasonal loans 3 ; and/or because the ship represents floating storage
and allows for term financing of the cargo transported; and/or because attractive
financial products exist for these four opportunities.
The third and final situation is when the actors conduct their activities in
the hopes of a marginal gain in opportunity. This case is encountered for example
in a disparate sector where several economic agents are suffering the effects of economic
decline. They enter the phase of low-level opportunities, in particular in the
used ship market, and are able to “bet” on the chance of slight gains, with an even
smaller initial stake, and by employing these mechanisms over multiple operations.
Here, the predominant logic is the same as the informal or even the underground
economy. Collectively, everyone loses, but since the stakes are low, each individual
only has a small amount of risk and minimal losses. And the probability of the appearance
of gains is high. Even if these gains are small, they add up. In the maritime
context, and when it comes to issues of capacity, there is a probability of gains in
the reselling of used ships. Actors must simply avoid being the last one in the resale
chain of the item. A sort of Ponzi loop of capacity is created, but one that is capitalistically
reversed. For this reason, in the maritime context, there are some areas of
the world with ships close to forty-five years old 4 that continue to be exchanged for
2 This trend has started to be observed in certain container shipping lines. In 2017, a seven-year-old
ship was dismantled, making it the newest ship to have ever been dismantled.
3 Seasonal loans are an advance on travel expenses, in other words on liquid assets.
4 In other words, built in the 1970s and, as it should be obvious, due to investment decisions that are
completely disconnected from the economic reality of 2017. These ships sail on secondary maritime
routes and in particular on South-South lanes. They are in immediate proximity to various
French overseas EEZs. Some also sail in the eastern Mediterranean and pass regularly through the
Strait of Gibraltar.
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