International Journal on Criminology Volume 6, Number 1, Spring 2018 | Page 72

Crises and Attacks: Some Avenues to Be Explored and Guidelines for Action
exceptional situations, it is necessary to think of new procedures, alternative solutions,
and innovative tools. The state of emergency is a palliative measure designed
to respond to a high threat level, but cannot be a permanent solution.
Although, in the eyes of political decision-makers, the state of emergency
represents one of the main responses to the risk of fresh attacks occurring, it is
not the solution that is best suited to preventing and managing major crisis situations.
Other, more effective ways of responding have yet to be invented, particularly—over
the medium and long term—where structural prevention measures are
concerned, and—over the short term—operational prevention measures. Crisis
researchers could be particularly useful in this.
It would also seem important to reflect on crisis strategies, that is to say the
strategies for attacks whose aim is to cause major crises designed to sweep aside
the most elaborate security measures. These pose a dual question: on the one hand,
how far are social structures able to cope with the loss of familiar landmarks—
something that typifies the onset of a crisis situation—and to think the unthinkable,
the unbearable? And on the other hand, how far are decision units able to
reconfigure rapidly, to adapt in order to meet the demands of the crisis? This is an
invitation to think about the time-frame of the crisis, to think of it as an interval
during which the system functions in exceptional mode.
Anticipating a crisis requires ways and means of strategic monitoring that
deal with blind spots and other taboo issues. But strategic monitoring is not sufficient.
We should also prepare ourselves upstream in order to limit the impact of
the psychological shock on decision units and facilitate their rapid reconfiguration.
The aim of these “reflexes” is to limit the pressure caused by the onset of the
crisis and assist strategic management and action-planning, which will provide
room for maneuver during the crisis (on the reflex phase see Lagadec 1991).
Simulation is one means of preparing to cope with a crisis. 9 For them to be
effective, these exercises must not be confined to conventional simulations. They
have to question the limits of organizations, lift the bans and break the taboos in
order to start creative and innovative dynamics going. These exercises and limits
have to bring together the different levels of decision and action (national, regional,
local/political-strategic, operational, and tactical) in such a way as to test
out plans and procedures. Coming face-to-face with a real crisis dynamic (loss
of bearings, an upsurge of problems, a state of emergency) means being forced
to introduce flexibility into tactical operations and security action plans. It is an
invitation to override traditional procedures, thus allowing crisis management capabilities
to be reinforced, particularly in terms of coordinating services.
9 Since 2001, we have been developing crisis simulations at the University of Lyon 3, but these exercises
are now supported by the Pôle d’Accompagnement à la Pédagogie Numérique (PAPN)
[Support Center for Digital Education]. In addition to their educational advantages, these exercises
also provide a particularly productive terrain for my research into crises, on which this article is
partially based.
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