International Journal on Criminology Volume 6, Number 1, Spring 2018 | Page 64

Syria: An Epistemological Obstacle
representatives of the rebellion agreed—for the very first time—to be physically in
the same room as the legitimate Syrian authorities.
This step forward even opened up muted confrontation within the new US
administration, as the Americans—furious at the Russian success—immediately
wanted to punish Staffan de Mistura by spreading rumors of his forthcoming departure
from the head of the Geneva negotiating team. However, the pragmatists'
more realist analysis prevailed. How could they justify firing de Mistura, who had
already called for negotiations to resume in Geneva on February 23? And most
importantly, who would replace him? After Kofi Annan, who had dealt with the
teething issues of this diplomatic mission, judged to be “the most difficult in the
world,” and Lakhdar Brahimi, whose proximity to Saudi Arabia prevented him
from gaining the ear of Damascus, Staffan de Mistura had not until now proven
unworthy to carry out his dangerous mission. Far from it!
As a result, and despite pressure from the old American neocons still in
the State Department and the Pentagon, Staffan de Mistura was able to keep his
post and persist in keeping the Geneva talks alive despite all the difficulties. Here
again, working methods outweigh advances, which will never be quick or spectacular.
We need only recall the laborious discussions leading to the creation of the
“Contact Group” in response to the Balkan war, which enabled signature of the
Dayton Accords—on December 14, 1995—that brought an end to the inter-ethnic
fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The two Astana summits have provided the opportunity to focus on the
commitment of the different parties to curb the use of force and promote the political
process, as head of the Russian diplomatic service Sergey Lavrov expressed with
satisfaction. By explaining that the talks in Geneva had to be more “inclusive” in
order to include other countries as part of this “contact group” approach, including
Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Moscow has continued to emphasize the complementarity
of Astana and Geneva, even convincing Washington of the aptness of such an
approach.
On its side, Tehran has also been sending out increased signs of appeasement
in the direction of Riyadh in order to explain the conditions of its engagement
in Syria, which is intended not to stoke an indirect war against Saudi Arabia,
but with the primary objective of neutralizing terrorist groups that threaten the
whole region, including the Wahabi monarchy.
The Turkish agenda is more difficult to reconcile with this “contact group”
logic even if it may—in time—be part of a common approach to resolving the crisis.
By engaging its armed forces against the settlement of Al-Bab, the nerve and
historic center of Syria’s Kurdish regions, then against Raqqa—the seat of ISIS in
Syria, a city with a Sunni majority—Ankara wants to nip in the bud any kind of
territorial continuity across an unlikely Kurdish entity encompassing the regions
held by the PJAK in Iran, Iraq’s quasi-autonomous Kurdistan, Syria’s PYD, and the
PKK in Turkey. In time again, this desire could transform into, if not come into
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