International Journal on Criminology Volume 6, Number 1, Spring 2018 | Page 17

International Journal on Criminology
The Animal Game and Its Murky Connections
with The Military Regime 1964–1985 23
In Brazil, conservatism and respect for the rule of law and moral standards were
responsible for the doctrine behind the coup d’état that removed the “communist
threat” presented by President João Goulart of the Brazilian Workers’ Party
(Partido dos Trabalhadores, PTB). The military wanted Brazil henceforth to abide
by the positivist motto on the Brazilian flag: “order and progress.” 24 These principles
suggested to the cariocas that the military government would bring Rio’s
increasing criminality under control. And to begin with, that is what happened.
However, the criminal fraternity’s adaptability succeeded in turning the tables.
The Bicheiros would profit from the very complex era of boom and bust in
Brazil between the 1960s and 1980s. The totalitarian chapter saw an “economic
miracle,” violent political repression of communism and left-wing organizations,
and finally the “lost decade,” when Brazil plunged into an economic crisis characterized
by an annual inflation rate of more than 200%, and by a fall in GDP that
marked the beginning of a severe recession. Relations between the Bicheiros and
the government were also marked by highs and lows.
Before going into the details of this complex relationship, we should emphasize
that ambiguous associations between totalitarian regimes and mafia organizations
is not a phenomenon unique to Brazil. According to Jacques de Saint Victor,
the Italian Mafia also managed to survive Benito Mussolini’s first years of power
and finally established a sort of coexistence with the Fascist regime, based on its
connections with high-ranking members of the Fascist party. 25
In Mussolini’s Italy, the Fascists could not, at first, tolerate organizations
powerful enough to compete with the state. Jacques de Saint Victor describes the
context in which the Duce appointed Cesare Mori as prefect of Palermo. Between
1925 and 1929, Mori’s iron fist pleased everyone. In the campaign against the
Mafia’s base in Sicily, the government proved that it was in control of its territory;
but the Mafia bosses also benefited from these measures, reinforcing their
status as they re-calibrated the balance of power between the families. But when
Cesare Mori went after the Mafia heavyweights, he was thwarted: the upper echelons
of Sicilian society, linked to the Mafia, managed to convince Mussolini that
Mori might destabilize the age-old coexistence between the Mafia and the state.
Following pressure from the elites, Mussolini removed Cesare Mori and Luigi
Giampietro, Palermo’s chief prosecutor. From 1932 onwards, the head of the government
and the Mafia reached an understanding. The Duce granted the Mafiosi
23 Aloy Jupiara and Chico Otavio, Os porões da contravenção (Rio de Janiero: Record, 2015). This
section is at a great extend based on the remarkable research realized by Jupiara and Otavio
who plunged into the intelligence military’s archives in order to reveal the Bicheiros’ relationship
with the military’s dictatorial regime.
24 Based on the positivist thinking of the French philosopher Auguste Comte.
25 Jacques de Saint Victor, Un pouvoir invisible (Paris: Gallimard, 2012).
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