International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 9

Answering the Terrorism Challenge
Ideas, Engagement and Integration
In the aftermath of 9/11 and as the Intelligence Division was re-engineering
itself to address the ongoing threat, there was no roadmap or playbook to follow.
There was no time for consultants to advise “how it’s done”; nor were there any
out there that would have the experience to do so since this was a completely new
world for municipal intelligence. This gap was mostly filled by the daily 8:00 A.M.
meeting of the Police Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence, and
the Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism. This is where new ideas were tossed
around and decided upon. Putting teeth into them came after the A.M. meeting.
Since almost all new initiatives involved a break or change from the past,
communications between senior management, supervisors, and detectives was key
to re-engineering the Division. The NYPD is among the most can-do organizations
imaginable. It is a paramilitary organization that when asked to do something, it gets
done. Period. In the post-9/11 era of NYPD counterterrorism intelligence, it was
essential that all levels of the Division involved in an activity fully understand what
needed to be done and why. Just doing something because the “front office” wanted
it was not good enough. This was especially so as the Division took on activities
that, if not done well, wisely, and by well-informed personnel, could run the risk of
breaching legal guidelines.
As this investment in personnel and program development progressed, the
Division steadily began to re-engineer itself from the bottom up as well as from the
top down. Mid-level managers, supervisors, and those closest to the ground steadily
and energetically introduced ideas and ways of doing things that improved on the
initiatives they were asked to take on. The Division became a hotbed of ideas on
how to accomplish things needed to protect New York City from another terrorist
attack. The intellectual ownership of the mission of the Intelligence Division by
those doing the day-in–day-out work was a key to its effectiveness and sustained
success.
Once the Intelligence Division got off the ground for its post-9/11
mission, some 16 separate units were eventually established. Each had a unique
responsibility, either in the intelligence collection, investigations, analysis, or
support arena. Some overlapped on the edges, some dovetailed perfectly, and
some were compartmentalized in extremis to protect the most sensitive sources
and methods. The priority then became making sure program managers—usually
Lieutenants—shared with colleagues what their units were doing, that de-confliction
was automatic, and that information moved seamlessly. To a person, they got it done
thanks to leadership from the Captains, Inspectors, and the most senior uniformed
officer Assistant Chief of the Intelligence Division, Tom Galati.
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