International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 7

Answering the Terrorism Challenge
Leadership
An effective counterterrorism intelligence program at the national or
subnational level must receive its guidance from and have the ear of the person
at the highest level of the organization the program is in. In the case of the
NYPD Intelligence Division, this meant Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly.
His commitment to having a high-quality, effective, and responsible intelligence
program was unambiguous, demanding, and unrelenting. These characteristics did
not translate into micromanagement as they might have. Rather, it meant keeping him
informed, avoiding surprising him with matters he should be knowing of, and never
hiding the bad news of a problem, failure, or foul-up that warrants his knowledge.
The mechanism he used to oversee NYPD Intelligence Division activities
was a daily, one hour or more, morning meeting. He was briefed on what was known
of the global and national terrorist picture—in substantial detail—what the Division
was learning about the threat locally, and how individual programs were performing.
His strategy was broad gauged, but also tightly focused. At the broadest level,
the strategy was to keep New York City as safe as we could within constitutional
bounds and Court guidelines; at the most tactical level, the guidance was to move
the odds against another terror attack and in our favor a little bit every day. Thus,
intelligence operations, investigations, and analysis demanded patience, persistence,
and continuous improvement.
Changing the Culture
Law enforcement and counterterrorism intelligence operations are not
necessarily a natural fit. NYPD detectives achieve success by making good arrests.
Among the best in the world, many found their way into the Intelligence Division
just prior to the 9/11 attacks. Most came from the Narcotics Division where success
meant large numbers of quickly done “buy and bust” operations. They were smart
and energetic detectives or supervisors, but good intelligence operations demanded
other qualities as well. Most importantly, patience in developing and testing assets,
keeping them in place for long durations—sometimes years—and careful collection,
documentation, and collation of intelligence information to be pieced together like a
puzzle.
Blending these vastly different cultures required change at all levels. First
and foremost, detectives were weaned off making fast-moving arrests in large
numbers. That meant no more cigarette or drug cases that traditionally were used
to build an inventory of confidential informants. New mechanisms were created to
develop confidential informants needed to address the rising threat of homegrown
radicalization. Ironically, long before ISIS emerged, the NYPD Intelligence Division
recognized and acted on that threat.
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