International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 58
International Journal on Criminology
and intellectual void: these gaps open the way to deviancy in human behavior—
criminality, terrorism, and plots against states. A deviant subculture takes form and
pseudo-legislators appear whose social function would be to promulgate new ethical
norms. A conversion then occurs, a distortion of the dominant values.
The lack (or disintegration) of moral references, political crises, and economic
changes place individuals in a situation of stress and imbalance, obliterating moral
references. As social morality weakens, criminogenic pseudo-fatwas appear, calling
for death, massacre, and devastation.
Programmed and carried out by Algerian terrorism, the assassination of
intellectuals did not aim merely to strike opponents of fundamentalism but expressed
the clear desire of those ordering the crimes to take over the function of knowledge
in the society. According to Lacassagne, social microbes only develop in a broth of
culture that can contain it and ensure its survival. Prospering in a climate of spiritual
poverty and nihilism, these sponsors aimed to strike the thinking head of the state after
targeting its secular arm.
The Global Strategic Power of Deviant Fatwas
Thanks to technology, this power is reinforced by an abundant and diverse—
but effective—literature that represents a bottomless source for minds disposed to
action. We are witnessing the birth of “Fatwa-natic” or the “Cloud of Fatwa” at
the disposal of users of all ages and beliefs, a concept borrowed from information
technology that nonetheless reveals reality.
The GIA does not share our views on building the Islamic state. We have our own idea
of holy war; however, despite our differences, for the supreme good of this nation,
I suggest that you work more on destroying America and we will be responsible for
France and its allies.
We will take care of America; may God guide you to destroy the unbelievers of
Europe who did so much harm to Islam and to Muslims.
From the end of 1995, these exchanges come from the correspondence between
Djamel Zitouni and Ayman El Zawahiri, the right hand of Oussama Ben Laden.
The GIA put its threats into action by hijacking an Airbus of Air France
(December 1994) and then struck France (attacks in the summer of 1995) and
assassinated the seven monks of Tibhirine (March 1996). El Qaïda first struck
American interests in Nairobi and Dar El Salam (August 1998) then the Twin Towers
in Manhattan (September 2001).
If these exchanges between the terrorist leaders had been published before
these events, they would have the subject of great mirth. How, observers would have
asked, could poorly armed criminals having difficulty ensuring their own survival dare
to strike these powers? “Using fatwas to create human bombs!” would be the response
of someone knowledgeable in the “terrorist thing.” These fatwas pronounced under
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